Effects & Future Aspects by Dilan Basak
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 
경 지. 하는  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다. 
 
 






Asymmetries in the FTA Process of the 
European Union-Turkey Customs Union 




유럽 연합 - 터키 관세 동맹 FTA 과정의 비대칭:  











Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 











Asymmetries in the FTA Process of the 
European Union-Turkey Customs Union 
Effects & Future Aspects 
 
Prof. Ahn Dukgeun 
 
 





Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 












Chair     Prof. Rhee Yeongseop     (Seal) 
Vice Chair     Prof. Ahn Jae Bin            (Seal) 






Asymmetries in the FTA Process of the European Union-Turkey Customs Union: 
Effects & Future Aspects 
 
Dilan Başak 
International Commerce Major 
Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 
 
The Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union (EU) has made many 
contributions to the economies of both parties since it was established in 1996. However, 
there are some problems in the current Customs Union that overshadow the future 
economic benefits. This paper will focus on one of these Customs Union problems 
between the EU and Turkey: The asymmetries in the Foreign Trade Agreement (FTA) 
process.  One of the asymmetries has resulted from the Common Commercial Policy of 
the EU. With the establishment of the Customs Union, Turkey has agreed to align its 
customs regulations same with the EU.  
 
As a result, while exports of third parties to Turkey is enjoying the benefits of tariff-free 
access, Turkey is still exposed to tariffs while exporting products to the same third party. 
This asymmetrical situation creates unfair market conditions for Turkey. Additionally, 
Turkey is bound to the EU in order to start negotiations and/or establish a new trade 
agreement with a third country.  
 
 ii 
Consequently, Turkey is seeking for possible options to solve this problem because the 
EU’s new trade strategy brings deep and comprehensive trade agreements with big 
economies that would create even bigger problems for the Turkish economy in the future. 
 
Keywords :  Turkey-European Union Customs Union, FTA asymmetries, common 
commercial policy, trade deficit 
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The Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union has made many 
contributions to economies of both parties since it was established in 1996. However, 
there are some problems in the current Customs Union that overshadow the future 
economic benefits. This paper will focus on one of these Customs Union problems 
between the EU and Turkey: The asymmetries in the Foreign Trade Agreement process. 
Under Customs Union obligations, Turkey accepted a common commercial policy that 
stems from Article 16 of the Customs Union Decision 1/95. In other words, Turkey is 
obliged to use the same tariff schedule with the trade partners of the European Union.  
Consequently, CU enables third parties tariff-free access to Turkey, while Turkey is still 
exposed to tariffs from third parties. The EU decides its own tariffs and Turkey has to 
implement the tariff rates of the EU without joining in the EU tariff setting process. This 
asymmetrical situation creates external competition for the Turkish market. 
 
Accordingly, Turkey started to negotiate for concluding FTAs with the countries 
that sign trade agreements with the EU in order to avoid trade deficit that is caused by the 
asymmetrical FTAs. However, third countries that have concluded an FTA with the EU 
sometimes are not in favor to conclude another FTA with Turkey. As a result, Turkish 
firms do not receive similar reciprocal access to these third country markets, while third 
country imports can often enter Turkey tariff-free via CU. Also, when the EU negotiates 
 2 
trade agreements with third parties, there is an inadequate Turkish participation that risks 
future trade benefits.
1 The proliferation of the EU FTAs, especially with larger countries 
with the bigger economic market such as Canada or Japan, risks larger possible losses for 
Turkey.  The EU-Turkey CU has been a very important implementation for Turkey to 
increase its economic welfare as well as the possibility to be a member of the EU. For this 
reason, the modernization of the CU is a significant issue for both sides.  
 
The first chapter briefly looks at the bilateral trade relationship between the EU 
and Turkey that started in 1959 when Turkey applied for the associate membership to the 
EU. After 4 years, the Association Agreement was signed in 1963. The objective of the 
Association Agreement was to encourage continuous and stable economic and trade 
relations between both parties and form a customs union progressively. This treaty has 
included three stages: a preparatory stage that lasts 5 years, a transitional stage that 
involves the establishment of CU and a final stage. Customs Union has initiated a fourfold 
increase in the bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey. However, Turkey has faced 
both advantages and challenges after concluding CU with the EU. On the one hand, CU 
enabled Turkey to become a part of the EU’s internal market for industrial goods, 
increased its international competitiveness and participation in the international economy. 
On the other hand, Turkey is facing asymmetrical problems and cannot solve it quickly 
because it cannot participate in the decision-making mechanism of the EU concerning 
                                               
1 See the report World Bank (2014a). “Evaluation of the EU - TURKEY Customs Union (85830-
TR)” 
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external economic relations. Turkey also lacks influence in the EU’s FTA negotiations 
with third countries. 
 
The second chapter provides an explanation of the asymmetrical FTA problem in 
CU. After the establishment of CU, Turkey has adopted the common external tariff of the 
EU and eliminated the customs regulations of imports from third countries. Also, in order 
to align itself with the common commercial policy, Turkey had to conclude FTAs with 
third countries within five years starting from 1996 in parallel with the EU. Chapter two 
also provides the legal text, which is DECISION No 1/95, that causes the asymmetrical 
problems in CU. Due to the obligations that Turkey has to take, CU enables the third 
parties, which have an FTA with EU, tariff-free access to Turkey. Accordingly, third 
parties enjoy the benefits of tariff-free Turkish market as long as they have FTA with the 
EU.  Turkey has to separately conclude an FTA with that third country because there is 
no reciprocal access for Turkey to enter third country’s market without an FTA. 
 
After the EU concludes a trade agreement with a country, Turkey also tries to 
start FTA negotiations for establishing an FTA in order to avoid possible trade deficit. 
Turkey starts negotiations just after the EU, however, the negotiation process, as well as 
the signature date, changes country to country.  Turkey’s FTAs obliges Turkey to 
eliminate tariffs as soon as the trade agreement comes into force while the partner country 
is allowed to abrogate its tariffs to Turkish products progressively. This progressive 
elimination of customs duties does not match with the EU’s trade agreements most of the 
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times. Therefore, the trade liberalization is asymmetrical and this progressive elimination 
makes a time gap when removing tariffs on Turkish exports up to several years.2 For 
instance, Turkey signed an FTA with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia after the EU and 
elimination of tariff schedule took 13, 9 and 9 years respectively. On the other hand, 
Turkey was already applying the tariff schedule of the EU because of the CU regulations. 
 
Currently, the EU has 36 trade agreements in place, 45 agreements partly in place 
and 8 ongoing negotiations.  The EU’s trade agreements consider Turkey since these 
countries will be able to export tariff-free products to Turkey while Turkey will still be 
faced to customs duties while exporting products to these countries unless there is a 
separate FTA. Recently, the EU has concluded a trade agreement with Canada and this 
agreement have potential economic risk for Turkey because of Canada’s economy size. 
Also, some of the countries that have concluded an FTA with the EU are not willing to 
have a similar trade arrangement with Turkey and this also creates an economic loss for 
Turkey. These third countries already gain indirect preferential access to the Turkish 
market. Thus, that country does not open its domestic market to exports from Turkey. 
Countries like Mexico, South Africa, and Algeria can be given as an example. 
Accordingly, Turkey faces a trade deficit from these countries because it does not have 
an FTA with them while the EU does. Additionally, South Korea and Chile case are given 
as an example to illustrate how the Turkish economy is effected after Turkey is managed 
                                               
2 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on Turkey: 
An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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to sign an FTA with a country after the EU. Lastly, the EU’s three different Customs 
Union with Turkey, Andorra, and San Marino will be analyzed. A comparison will be 
made for these three countries and their CU in order to have a better understanding of the 
differences. 
 
The third chapter shows the possible actions and attempts to solve the FTA 
problem. The EU is currently in negotiations for deeper trade agreements with the 
deadlock in the Doha Round for multilateral trade negotiations and the cost of the FTA 
asymmetries will increase with deeper trade agreements with big markets. Both the 
Turkish government and the EU recognize the shortcomings of the CU, including the FTA 
asymmetry problem and agreed on modernizing and updating the CU. The EU started to 
include a “Turkey Clause” that invites its trading partner to negotiate a similar trade 
agreement with Turkey. However, this joint declaration is not binding for third countries 
so most of the times it is inefficient. In order to avoid the asymmetries in the FTA process, 
one of the best solutions would be to have a single and joint negotiation because FTA 
problems mainly arise from the fact that Turkey does not have right to participate the 
EU’s decision-making process. Another solution would be to improve the functioning of 
CU while addressing its design deficiencies and extending the scope of the bilateral trade 
with a new FTA that covers liberalization in services and agriculture, establishment and 
public procurement. Last option would be to replace CU with an FTA that covers all 
 6 
goods trade including industrial, agricultural and fishery products, services, non-tariff 
barriers, public procurement as well as the establishment.3 
 
Lastly, the final chapter summarizes the findings and draws the conclusion of the 
FTA asymmetry problem in the EU-Turkey CU. It also indicates the importance of the 











                                               
3 See the report European Commission. (2016b). “Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential 




CHAPTER I: Bilateral Trade of The EU-Turkey After 
Customs Union 
 
1. Benefits of the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
 
In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Union, which 
was known as the European Economic Community (EEC) during that time. With this 
application, the process of EU membership for Turkey has started along with the 
relationship of Bilateral Preferential Trade Framework (BPTF) between both parties. In 
1963, associate membership application resulted in an Association Agreement (the 
Ankara Agreement), which is seen as a legal basis of the EU-Turkey Association, between 
the EEC and Turkey, whereby the parties agreed to create a Customs Union. 4 
Consequently, the CU was established in 1996 through the EU–Turkey Association 
Council Decision 1/95.  Excluding European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) products, 
the CU covers industrial goods including processed agricultural commodities. The main 
objective of the CU is the free circulation of the goods inside the CU territory. The CU 
has increased competitiveness in the manufacturing sectors of Turkey. Also, the demand 
for Turkish exports in the EU market, as well as the foreign direct investment flows to 
Turkey increased considerably. 
                                               
4 See Aytuğ, H., et al. (2017). "Twenty Years of the EU-Turkey Customs Union: A Synthetic 
Control Method Analysis." 
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Customs Union can be seen as the last stage of Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
Turkey and Greece are the only countries that had or have a customs union with the EU 
as a final step to be a member country. After signing the agreement in 1961, Greece 
fulfilled its CU duty and became a member state in 1981. The CU between Turkey and 
the EU has been established with the same purpose in accordance with Ankara Agreement 
Article 28 as follows: 
 
“Article 28 of Ankara Agreement5 
As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough 
to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations 
arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the 
Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of 
Turkey to the Community.” 
 
During the BPTF period, the bilateral trade grew very strongly and promoted 
trade creation between the EU and Turkey. The EU is currently Turkey’s number one 
trading partner and CU has a big role to achieve this. Figure 1 shows Turkey’s exports to 
world trade and to EU member countries. It can be clearly seen that Turkey’s export to 
                                               




the EU is almost half of its total exports to the world. In 2018, the EU’s share in Turkish 
exports was 50% with approximately 84 billion USD. 
 
 
Figure 1: Turkey's total export to world and to EU (2009-2018)6 
 
As Figure 2 shows clearly, the EU’s share in exports and imports of Turkey have 
been increasing since the CU was established in 1996. When the Customs Union was first 
established in 1996, the total exports of Turkey were around 23 billion USD while imports 
were 43 billion USD and more than half of the total imports and exports of Turkey were 
with the EU. Countries that share a common border or geographically close have higher 
levels of trade volume.7  Geographical closeness and size of the markets had a significant 
impact on the international trade between parties.  
                                               
6 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Annual exports by country groups): 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=625 
7 See Hartler, C. and S. Laird (1999). "The EU Model and Turkey—A Case for Thanksgiving?" 
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Figure 2: EU’s Share in  Imports and Exports of Turkey after Customs Union (1996-2018)8 
 
In early 2000, the imports from the EU has decreased from 28 billion USD to 19 
billion USD because of the financial crisis that caused devaluation and consequently 
lower rate of imports in general. In 2008, there was also a change of rapid increasing. The 
exports value was around 63 billion USD and it decreased to 47 billion USD. Similarly, 
the import value has decreased from 74 billion USD to 56 billion USD. The reason behind 
the decrease in 2008 can be explained with the global crisis that contracted the demand 
worldwide. 
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After 2009, both imports and exports have been increased. Also, the gap in trade 
balance has expanded until 2018. Turkish imports have always been higher than exports 
until 2018. In the previous year, the EU share of Turkish exports has ranked 83 billion 
971 million USD, while the EU share of Turkish imports was 80 billion 813 million USD. 
Turkey gained importance as a trading partner for the EU. “For Turkey, trade with the EU 
surged, but the commitment to an open trading regime mandated by the BPTF resulted in 
trade with third parties surging even more.”9  
 
 
Figure 3: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance of EU to Turkey (2002-2018)10 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, exports of the EU to Turkey has been always higher 
than their imports from Turkey, which means the EU has recorded trade surplus for many 
                                               
9 See the report European Commission (2016a). “Impact Assessment” 
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years. The highest export rate has been recorded in 2017 with 84 billion EUR while the 
highest import rate has been recorded in the previous year with 76 billion EUR. Also, 
similar to the EU’s share in Turkey’s imports and exports, the trade balance was recorded 
minimum with 1,1 million EUR in 2018. For the EU, Turkey’s share of imports increased 
generally and ranked 3.8% while the share of exports was fluctuating and ranked 4% in 
the previous year.  
 
According to the research concluded by Larch, M., et al. (2019), EU-Turkey CU 
has increased bilateral trade between both parties by 60%. It was also concluded that “the 
CU was much more successful in boosting trade than other regional trade agreements, 
which increased bilateral trade by 28% approximately. While the CU has contributed an 
increase in the EU exports to Turkey by 49%, Turkish exports to the EU have risen by 
74%.”11 
 
As Togan (2015) emphasizes, “the EU–Turkey CU of 1995 has been a major 
instrument of integration into the EU and global markets for Turkey, offering the country 
powerful tools to reform its economy. It has credibly locked Turkey into a liberal foreign 
trade regime for industrial goods and holds the promise of Turkey’s participation in the 
EU internal market for industrial products. As a result, Turkish producers of industrial 
goods have become exposed to competition from imports and they operate within one of 
                                               
11 See Larch, M., et al. (2019). "A Tale of (Almost) 1001 Coefficients: Deep and Heterogeneous 
Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union." 
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the largest FTAs for industrial products in the world. They are now protected by tariffs 
from external competition to exactly the same extent that EU producers are, and as such, 
face competition from duty-free imports of industrial goods from world-class pan-
European firms. In return, Turkish industrial producers have duty-free market access to 




2. Negative effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
 
Although the EU-Turkey CU contributed economic benefits to both Turkey and 
third parties, it also created some negative effects that should be reviewed in order to 
achieve a mutually advantageous relationship. Especially under the existing agreement, 
the new trade agreements of the EU create negative effects on Turkish welfare. It was 
widely agreed that the current CU has become outdated and should be modernized. The 
negative effects and/or shortcomings of the CU can be specified as the limited scope and 
the influence of the CU, lack of decision-making capacity of Turkey, regulatory 
challenges, visa barriers and transport problems, and lastly external asymmetry in the 
FTAs which will be covered in this paper. 
 
                                               
12 See Togan, S. (2015). “The EU-Turkey customs union: a model for future Euro-Med 
integration.” 
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CU excludes important areas such as services, public procurement and right of 
establishment. The scope of new generation FTAs of the EU is more comprehensive 
compared to the EU-Turkey CU that covers only industrial and processed agricultural 
products. As the EU’s FTAs increase, it creates a potential power weakness for Turkey. 
Also, CU does not eliminate all technical barriers to trade because Turkey stays outside 
of the EU’s single market. Therefore, it creates indirect costs for Turkish exporters. 
 
The visa requirement creates big obstacles for Turkish businessmen and it is 
directly connected to the development of bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey.  
“Since the EU is the largest market for Turkish goods, Turkish business people and 
economic operators at large need to travel frequently to the EU for the purposes of 
attending trade fairs, negotiating contracts, meeting people, attending meetings, etc. Yet, 
the visa-requirement imposed on Turkish nationals hampers these activities, increases the 
costs or even renders it impossible.”13 In this regard, the free movement of businessmen 
in Turkey seems essential for a better working CU. 
 
As Karatas, I., et al. (2016) emphasizes, both Turkey and the EU has abolished the 
quantitative barriers or measures having equivalent effect with the adoption of CU. 
“While the abolishment of these quotas is accomplished in the area of free movement of 
goods, the same cannot be said of the transport sector. By subjecting Turkish vehicles 
                                               
13 See Karatas, I., et al. (2016). "The EU-Turkey Customs Union: Towards a Revision of the 
Legal and Institutional Framework?" 
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entering the EU market to road transport quotas and transport permits, free movement of 
goods is hit in its means to be effectuated. Consequently, Turkey is dubbed the only 
country subject to transport quota but not to a trade quota. There are also quota limits on 
the number of transport while giving permission.”14 
 
Turkey is bound to align its commercial policy and technical regulations with the 
EU because of the CU regulations. However, Turkey does not participate in the EU’s 
decision-making mechanism even though if there were some cases where Turkey 
participated in the meetings but it has no right to vote in the decision-making process. 
There has been no amendment about the decision-making process ever since the 
establishment of the CU and this situation is leading an asymmetrical situation.  Even 
though Turkey’s membership in the EU seems to be the best solution to this problem, it 








                                               
14 See Karatas, I., et al. (2016). "The EU-Turkey Customs Union: Towards a Revision of the 
Legal and Institutional Framework?" 
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CHAPTER II: Literature Review 
 
The major reason behind this FTA problem can be explained with the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) of the EU. When Turkey and the EU established the Customs 
Union to enhance the trade creation, they also established common arrangements to 
implement when the member states import products from other countries. This CCP is 
based on a Common External Tariff, which helps to abolish customs duties and 
quantitative restrictions between parties. Throughout years, CCP’s main focus was on the 
internal market harmonization, customs duty lowering and non-tariff barriers unification 
for third countries.15  Therefore, it can be said that CCP has a significant effect on the EU 
economy both internally and externally. 
 
The FTA Problem of the EU-Turkey Customs Union can be found in most of the 
articles that argue about the CU effectiveness. Hartler, C. and S. Laird (1999) points out 
that, “eliminating the customs duties on imports of non-agricultural products originating 
in the EU and adopting of the EU’s CET for imports of these products from third countries 
has led to a substantial reduction of its average tariffs on all imports, called as a 
thanksgiving to third countries.”16 
 
                                               
15 See Tkachuk, A. (2016). "Common Commercial Policy of the European Union and its 
significance to the world trade. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership case study." 
16 See Hartler, C. and S. Laird (1999). "The EU Model and Turkey—A Case for Thanksgiving?" 
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Ülgen et al. (2004) emphasizes that this asymmetric FTA structure creates a 
disadvantageous position for Turkish exporters. They also point out “Turkey has also been 
at risk of losing potential tariff revenues since goods originating from these third countries 
might not have been exported to Turkey directly but re-exported from the EU so as to take 
advantage of the lack of import duties.”  Çalışkan, Ö. (2009) emphasizes that “as a natural 
consequence of this CU framework, it can be said that the Turkish foreign trade policy 
and its integral part of foreign policy are designed mainly by EC. In this case, if EU 
concludes an agreement with a third country, even which is not laid down in ACD 1/95 
(such as Mexico and S. Africa in the past), Turkey is in a position of automatic application 
of the provisions of such agreement.” 
 
Larch, M., et al. (2019) point out in their research that “after CU came into effect, 
the reductions in bilateral trade frictions between Turkey and non-EU countries have 
increased trade flows by 28%. Also, a larger increase is found for Turkish imports from 
non-EU countries than for its exports to these countries, which explains the trade 
deflection caused by CET. The asymmetry in CU between the EU and Turkey effects 
shrinks and indicates that Turkish exports benefited only a little more than EU exports.” 
Altay, S. (2018) also mentiones in his research that accepting common commercial policy 




Doğan, A., & Uzun, A. (2014) emphasize in their research that the trade 
agreements that the EU signs with third parties also come into effect at the same time in 
Turkey because of the CU obligations. Turkey tries to start FTA negotiations with these 
third parties in order to prevent trade deflection. However, the time period between the 
agreements of the EU-third party and Turkey-third party puts Turkey in a disadvantageous 
position. Because Turkey also removes tariff against third countries similar with the EU 
due to the CU regulations. 
 
Regarding the FTA with third parties,  Yılmaz, K. (2011) emphasizes on his study 
that “the EU negotiates and signs FTAs with third countries without any participation of 
Turkey and without taking Turkey’s interest into account, something that could possibly 
lead to unfair trade competition for Turkey. Turkey was supposed to sign FTAs of its own 
with these countries, but it has proven rather difficult for Turkey to obtain concessions as 
lucrative as the EU has.” 
 
In order to have a better functioning EU-Turkey Customs Union, Aslı Bilgin, A. 
(2018) points out that Turkey should be able to participate more effectively to decision 
making process of the CU. She also mentions that if there are parallel negotiations 





CHAPTER III: Legal Basis of the FTAs in the EU-
Turkey Customs Union 
 
Customs Union came into effect with DECISION No 1/9517 of the Turkey-EC 
Association Council along with the Article XXIV of GATT. Under the Article XXIV of 
GATT, Turkey has adopted the common external tariff of the EU and eliminated the 
customs regulations of imports from third countries. As mentioned in Article XXIV, 
Turkey is conditional on applying the same duties and other regulations of commerce to 
the trade of territories not included in the union. In other words, the CU that was 
established between the EU and Turkey has eliminated the rules of origin, which 
determines the national sources of a product, that was normally implemented in FTAs. 
 
As mentioned in Article 4 of Decision 1/95 below, Turkey binds itself to conclude 
the same or similar preferential agreements and implement the Generalized Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) for its relation with third countries. Seen from an EU perspective, CCP 
is an exclusive competence of the Union.  Article 4 of Decision 1/95 states; 
 
“Article 4 of Decision 1/95 
Import or export customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect shall be wholly abolished between the Community and Turkey 
on the date of entry into force of this Decision. The Community and 
                                               
17 Source: The EU website,  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc_115267.pdf 
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Turkey shall refrain from introducing any new customs duties on 
imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect from that 
date. These provisions shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal 
nature.” 
 
As stipulated in the Article 12, Turkey applied the EU’s common policy in these 
regulations: “common rules for imports, common rules for imports from certain third 
countries, common rules for imports from certain third countries, Community procedure 
for administering quantitative quotas, protection against dumped and subsidized imports, 
Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy, establishing 
common rules for exports, officially supported export credits, outward processing 
arrangements for textiles and clothing; textile imports under common rules, textile 
imports under autonomous arrangements and textile imports from Taiwan.” 
 
Turkey also had aligned itself with the common customs tariff of the EU while 
trading with the third countries which are not members of the community. Article 13 of 
Decision 1/95 states; 
 
“Article 13 of Decision 1/95 
1. Upon the date of entry into force of this Decision, Turkey shall, in 
relation to countries which are not members of the Community, 
align itself on the Common Customs Tariff. 
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2. Turkey shall adjust its customs tariff whenever necessary to take 
account of changes in the Common Customs Tariff. 
3. The Customs Cooperation Committee shall determine what 
measures are appropriate to implement paragraphs 1 and 2.” 
 
“Together with the Common External Tariffs, the Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTA) constitute the most important part of the trade policy applied towards third 
countries.”18  Article 16 of Decision 1/95 sets the rules and modalities of the alignment. 
In order to align itself with the common commercial policy, Turkey had to conclude FTAs 
with third countries within five years starting from 1996. Article 16 of Decision 1/95 
states; 
“Article 16 of Decision 1/95 
1. With a view to harmonizing its commercial policy with that of the 
Community, Turkey shall align itself progressively with the 
preferential customs regime of the Community within five years as 
from the date of entry into force of this Decision. This alignment will 
concern both the autonomous regimes and preferential agreements 
with third countries. To this end, Turkey will take the necessary 
measures and negotiate agreements on mutually advantageous basis 
with the countries concerned. The Association Council shall 
periodically review the progress made. 
                                               
18 See Çalışkan, Ö. (2009). "An analysis on the alignment process of Turkey to the EU’s FTAs 
under the customs union and current challenges." 
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2. In each of the cases referred to in paragraph 1 the granting of these 
tariff preferences shall be conditional on compliance with provisions 
relating to the origin of products identical to those governing the 
granting of such preferences by the Community.” 
 
Lastly, similar with the Article 16, Article 54 of Decision 1/95 also states the 
requirement for Turkey to progressively align itself with the EU customs regime. Article 
54 states; 
“Article 54 
47. In areas of direct relevance to the operations of the Customs 
Union, and without prejudice to the other obligations deriving from 
Chapters I to IV Turkish legislation shall be harmonized as far as 
possible with Community legislation.” 
 
CU was expected to be the last step of being a member of the EU for Turkey. 
While establishing the EU-Turkey CU, these legal bindings were not seen as possible 
causes for economic loss. However, Turkey is now legally bound to the EU customs tariff 
for the imports from third countries and the effects are getting bigger since the EU keeps 
establishing deeper FTAs with third countries. 
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CHAPTER IV: Negative Outcomes of Asymmetrical 
FTA 
 
1. Common Commercial Policy  
 
As mentioned previously, “Turkey has adopted the EU’s common external tariff 
against third country imports of industrial goods and the industrial component of 
processed agricultural goods.”19  The FTAs of the EU with third countries do not fully 
cover Turkey in terms of import regulations. CU enables the third parties, which have an 
FTA with EU, tariff-free access to Turkey. Because of this reason, even if the subject 
third country does not have FTA with Turkey, they still enjoy the benefits of the Turkish 
market as long as they have FTA with the EU. However, there’s no reciprocal access for 
Turkey to enter third country’s market unless Turkey separately concludes FTA with the 
third country, or is included in EU-third party FTA negotiations. As it was mentioned in 
the study of European Commission (2016b), “Turkey cannot grant tariff preferences in 
WTO negotiations independently of the EU, nor can it apply lower tariffs than the 
common commercial tariff in its bilateral trade agreements. The EU decides its own tariffs 
and Turkey has to adopt the tariff rates of the EU without joining in the EU tariff setting 
process.” 20  This asymmetrical situation creates external competition for the Turkish 
market. 
                                               
19 See Hartler, C. and S. Laird (1999). "The EU Model and Turkey—A Case for Thanksgiving?" 
20 See the report European Commission. (2016b). “Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential 




The FTA Asymmetry problem creates a heavy burden for Turkey. “Turkey is 
forced to apply reduced or no tariff rates, while the third countries do not reduce their 
duties for Turkish imports. Secondly, Turkey also suffers tariff revenue losses, as the 
goods won’t enter the European Customs Area through Turkey.”21  The exporters have an 
incentive to transfer goods via the EU as long as they have concluded an FTA with the 
EU but not necessarily with Turkey.  As Nas, Ç . and Y. Ö zer (2017) state in their article, 
“Turkey has implemented origin controls on imports from the EU, particularly in sensitive 
sectors, to determine whether they originate from countries that have an FTA with the 
EU.”22 
 
Turkey has introduced a protection measure based on the rule of origins in order 
to import cars from Mexico. The main goal of this measure was to prevent trade deficit. 
As it was mentioned in the World Bank (2014b) document, “use of such measures 
undermine the elimination of costly origin requirements, one of the key advantages to the 
CU. Another measure Turkey has introduced is the application of additional customs 
duties for some textile products from countries that are outside of the EU and the EU’s 
FTA partners. In order to apply the additional customs duties, origin controls were being 
                                               
21 See Karatas, I., et al. (2016). “The EU-Turkey Customs Union: Towards a Revision of the 
Legal and Institutional Framework?” 
22 See Nas, Ç . and Y. Ö zer (2017). “Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles” 
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conducted based on the customs declarations instead of a physical check.”23 Consequently, 
market access opportunities for Turkey have been lost. 
 
Regarding the additional fiscal duty on motor vehicles originating from Mexico, 
European Commission (2016b)  study mentions that “Turkish government officials who 
were interviewed for this study pointed out that this instrument is only exceptionally 
applied but added that Turkey might extend such measures to other products/countries in 
similar cases where trade diversion can possibly occur. They also stated that the measure 
was based on Article 58(2) of Decision No 1/95, which foresees the possibility for the 
parties to take measures to remedy the injury where discrepancies in the implementation 
of the commercial policy cause to impairment of free circulation of goods or deflection 
of trade.”24 
 
As Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004) emphasize that third countries profits from 
this asymmetrical situation by trading with Turkey. They point out “third parties’ 
agreement with the EU allowed them to export tariff-free to the Turkish market, as their 
goods would enter into free circulation within the Community and therefore within the 
EU-Turkey CU. In return, they did not have to reciprocate because under the FTA only 
goods originating from the EU member states would profit from the preferential 
                                               
23 See the report World Bank (2014b). “Trading up to High Income: Turkey Country” 
24 See the report European Commission. (2016b). “Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential 
Trade Framework, Including the Customs Union, and an Assessment of Its Possible 
Enhancement” 
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arrangements.” 25  Consequently, the FTA system of the CU diminished Turkey’s 
bargaining power with third countries. 
 
The asymmetries arising from the common commercial policy also affects the 
EU business interests in Turkey. According to World Bank (2014a), “there were 47 EU-
majority own firms that export to South Africa and 39 EU-majority own firms exporting 
to Algeria in 2006. These numbers increased to 59 and 44 in 2009, respectively. There 
were also more than 30  EU-owned firms that export to Mexico and all these EU-owned 
firms in Turkey accounted for 7-10% of the total firms that export to these three countries. 
The number of domestic-majority owned firms that export to these countries were higher 
but they represent a smaller percentage of 2% of the total exports. The EU-majority owned 
firms significantly have larger values to South Africa, Algeria, and Mexico than the 
domestic-majority owned firms. This situation shows that it would be in the EU’s own 
interest to negotiate with Turkey to finalize FTAs with third countries with which the EU 
has FTAs.”26 It was also stated in the World Bank (2014a) report “Turkish firms have not 
received automatic reciprocal access to some of those markets with which the EU has 
negotiated FTAs, leaving them at a competitive disadvantage to EU exporters, weakening 
Turkey’s trade negotiating position with these countries and causing trade deflection that 
risks the imposition of origin controls that could undermine the benefits of the CU.” 
                                               
25 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 




“Turkey had one of the lowest applied most-favored nation (MFN) tariff levels 
on industrial goods, averaging 4.1% among developing countries, while tariffs on the 
larger non-agricultural goods category 27  average 5.5%. Such low MFN tariffs 
significantly effects the common external tariffs that are applied on these goods by all EU 
members. However, countries like Argentina (14.3%), Brazil (14.1%), Egypt (10.7%) and 
Indonesia (7.8%) have higher average applied tariffs on non-agricultural products. Turkey 
also has lower average bound MFN tariffs, averaging 17%, on non-agricultural products 
than these countries. Consequently, Mexico may impose up to 34.8% tariffs on non-
agricultural products from non-FTA countries.”28  Turkey, however, does not have this 
privilege. Even though Turkey is considered as a middle-income country, it has tariffs on 
non-agricultural products  on a developed country level tariff rate, which is 5.5% average, 
because of the CU. 
As Zahariadis, Y. (2004) implies, “deep integration measures such as 
harmonization with EU technical regulations have further enhanced market access. 
Estimates of the gains are not as strong as those obtained through traditional integration, 
but it is suggested that Turkey has gained around 0.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
from harmonization with EU technical regulations.”29 
                                               
27 Including industrial products, fish and fishery products, minerals, metals and petroleum 
products, leather and rubber products. 
28 See Colares, J. F. and M. T. Durmus (2019). "TURK-SWITCH: The Tariff-Leverage and Legal 
Case for Turkey’s Switch from EU–Turkey Customs Union to FTAs with the European Union 
and Beyond." 




Regarding the statistical trade effects of the CET, Larch, M., et al. (2019) suggest 
in their research that “after CU came into effect, the reductions in bilateral trade frictions 
between Turkey and non-EU countries have increased trade flows by 28%. Also, a larger 
increase is found for Turkish imports from non-EU countries than for its exports to these 
countries, which explains the trade deflection caused by CET. The asymmetry in CU 
between the EU and Turkey effects shrinks and indicates that Turkish exports benefited 
only a little more than EU exports.”30 
 
According to their regression analysis, trade costs might have heterogenous 
effects on a sectoral basis as well. They used data of seven different sectors which are 
textile, wood, paper, chemicals, minerals, metal and machinery, and revealed that the EU-
Turkey CU has different impacts across industries. The largest effect was found in wood 
and machinery while chemicals and minerals had the smallest effect. Except metals, the 
EU-Turkey CU has significantly contributed trade flows. 
 
2. FTA with Third Countries 
 
Turkey has agreed to engage in FTA negotiations in parallel with EU because of 
the CU obligations when the EU-Turkey CU came into effect. In other words, Turkey had 
                                               
30 See Larch, M., et al. (2019). "A Tale of (Almost) 1001 Coefficients: Deep and Heterogeneous 
Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union." 
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followed for the EU to start negotiations for concluding an FTA in order to engage FTA 
negotiations with third countries. “A ‘Turkey Clause’ was meant to give signal to the third 
parties but could not force them to negotiate with Turkey, as observed in the case with 
Algeria and Mexico.”31  
 
FTA process of Turkey makes the trade regime complex and difficult. As 
Çalışkan, Ö. (2009) emphasizes, “Turkey unilaterally has adopted the EU trade policies 
including preferential regimes as a policy-taker, rather than one of the counterparties of 
policy-making process.”32 At that time the CU was established, Turkey was expected to 
be a full member of the EU in four to eight years if the membership obligations were 
fulfilled by Turkey. Therefore the decision-making process was not considered as a 
problem because Turkey would participate in the decision-making process and have 
influence on the trade negotiations of the EU once becoming a member country. However, 
Turkey is still not a member country of the EU and the decision making problem creates 
a big problem. 
 
As mentioned in Article 16 of Decision No 1/95, Turkey agreed to align its 
commercial policy with the EU and conclude FTAs with third parties within five years 
starting from the date of entry into force, which is 1996. However, Turkey was unable to 
                                               
31 See Erzan, R. (2018). "Customs Union between EU and Turkey: A Success Story to be 
Nurtured." 
32 See Çalışkan, Ö. (2009). "An analysis on the alignment process of Turkey to the EU’s FTAs 
under the customs union and current challenges." 
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meet the deadline because of the unwilling behavior of some third countries in the process 
of FTA negotiations. As a result of the CU, “third countries could export products to 
Turkey on a preferential basis but did not have to extend this preferential arrangement to 
Turkey. Furthermore, this asymmetric structure also put Turkish exporters at a 
disadvantageous position with regard to EU exporters in those third countries. Turkey has 
also been at risk of losing potential tariff revenues since goods originating from these 
third countries might not have been exported to Turkey directly but re-exported from the 
EU so as to take advantage of the lack of import duties.” 33   In other words, this 
asymmetrical situation creates unfair competitiveness for the Turkish market. The current 
CU also cannot fulfill WTO’s one of the main principles of the trading system: promoting 
fair competition.  
 
Even though the EU-Turkey CU requires common regulations and trade policies, 
there was no proper cooperation between the EU and Turkey when it comes to carry out 
changes in commercial policies. As Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004) states, “the EU 
went ahead and concluded FTA agreements without actually taking into consideration the 
existence of a customs union arrangement with Turkey. As such, there were no prior 
consultations with Turkey and therefore Turkish concerns did not come into play during 
these negotiations. Yet because of the CU arrangement, Turkey was forced to conclude a 
                                               
33 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 
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similar agreement with those countries after the EU did.”34 The FTAs that have been 
concluded after 1996, including Mexico, South Africa and etc., can be given as an 
example. 
 
According to the Computable General Equilibrium model that World Bank 
(2014a) used, “Turkey’s real income would increase as a result of finalizing non-
compliant FTAs. Simulations were run assuming the ten economies identified in the 
Global Trade Analysis Project database that currently do not have an FTA for industrial 
goods with Turkey concluded one and so Turkey could export duty-free to these markets. 
The results show that from concluding FTAs, Turkey would gain the highest income from 
Mexico with 111 million USD, secondly from  South Africa with 115 million USD and 
thirdly from Colombia with  41 million USD. Sectors that would experience the largest 
increases in exports would be textiles to Mexico; clothing to Mexico and South Africa; 
paper products to South Africa; petroleum and coal products to Mexico; and motor 
vehicles and parts to Mexico, South Africa and Colombia.”35 
 
Additionally, according to a difference-in-differences analysis conducted by 
Dincer, N. N., et al. (2018), there is a statistically significant effect on the trade diversion of 
the EU-Algeria FTA on Turkey. “There is also an announcement effect of the FTA that 
                                               
34 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 
35 See the report World Bank. (2014a). “Evaluation of the EU - TURKEY Customs Union 
(85830-TR)” 
 32 
shows a trade diversion between Turkey and Algeria in the period when the EU-Algeria 
FTA was announced three years before its adoption. The results also show that Turkish 
exports to Algeria could have been 12% higher if there had been no FTA between the EU 
and Algeria. Additionally, Turkish imports from Algeria could have been 17% higher if 
the FTA had not been adopted.”36 
 
The asymmetrical FTAs became a frustration for Turkey specially in mid-2000s. 
The EU has embraced a new trade strategy and focused on the wide-ranging FTAs with 
big economies such as South Korea, Canada and Japan . Also, Turkey was concerned 
about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and tried to joined the 
talks in order to avoid the big trade deflection that would come from the US before its 
suspension. 
 
“If TTIP was implemented, industrial products from the United States would have 
a free access to Turkish market.”37  On the other hand, Turkey would not have reciprocity 
in the US market while Turkish goods would have to compete with the US products in 
the EU market. As Wasinski, M. (2015) implies, based on the assumption of a 
Bertelsmann-IFO study, Turkey could experience losses in the long term exceeding 5% 
of GDP along with other countries such as Mexico and Norway.38 In another study,  
                                               
36 See Dincer, N. N., et al. (2018). "Costs of a missing FTA: the case of Turkey and Algeria." 
37 See Alkan, U. (2017). "The Modernization of Turkey’s Customs Union with the European 
Union: Reasons and Possible Outcomes." 
38 See Wasinski, M. (2015). "TTIP and Third Countries: Making It More Transatlantic." 
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Felbermayr, G., et al. (2015) have provided “no indication to date of how Turkish 
industrial structures, especially in the medium term, would be affected by TTIP and the 
other EU free trade agreements currently under negotiation”.39 The  study also shows the 
possible scenarios for the implementation of TTIP to show what kind of effect it would 
create in Turkish economy if it was implemented. According to the GTAP CGE 
simulation study, “Turkey would face a welfare loss of US$ 130 million if the EU and the 
US remove all tariff on bilateral trade but Turkey continues to face restrictions in the US 
market and maintains tariffs on the US imports”. Second scenario shows that the welfare 
loss for Turkey increases to US$ 160 million if Turkey eliminates its import tariffs on the 
US manufactures. On the other hand, the welfare increases to US$ 130 million with 
largest export rate of textile and clothing if Turkey and the EU conclude an FTA with the 
US.40 
 
Therefore, as Alkan, U. (2017) implies, “Turkey considered to negotiate its own 
FTA with the US. Another option would have been to allow the accession of countries 
like Turkey, Mexico and Canada to TTIP. However, accession to TTIP or a separate FTA 
with the USA would imply that Turkey has to undertake a higher level of trade integration 
in areas such as agriculture, services and public procurement. Alignment with the relevant 
                                               
39 See Felbermayr, G., et al. (2015). "Macroeconomic potentials of transatlantic free trade: A 
high resolution perspective for Europe and the world." 
40 See the report World Bank. (2014a). “Evaluation of the EU - TURKEY Customs Union 
(85830-TR).” 
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EU acquis and horizontal rules through the modernization may facilitate Turkey’s 
accession to TTIP or the conclusion of an FTA with the USA.”41 
 
The EU and Canada has signed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) on 30 October 2016 and it is provisionally applied since 21 September 2017. 
CETA lowers the customs tariffs and other trade barriers between the EU and Canada. 
This agreement also effects Turkey directly due to the CU between Turkey and the EU. 
In other words, Canada now has the partial privilege to export tariff-free items to Turkey 
while Turkey does not have this opportunity without a separate FTA agreement with 
Canada. After CETA negotiations between the EU and Canada have started in 2009, 
Turkey also tried to start negotiations for an FTA. There is a mutual agreement on starting 
the FTA negotiations between Turkey and Canada since 2010 but there has been no 
progress. 
 
Table 1: Turkey's Trade Volume and Trade Balance with Canada (2012-2018) 
Years 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Trade Volume 2,012 2,297 2,058 1,600 1,792 3,213 3,253 
Trade Balance 105 -417 -157 -258 -333 -1,121 -708 
 
Table 1 shows the trade volume and trade balance between Canada and Turkey 
in the period of 2012-2018. After the CETA, the trade volume between Canada and 
                                               
41 See Alkan, U. (2017). "The Modernization of Turkey’s Customs Union with the European 
Union: Reasons and Possible Outcomes." 
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Turkey has increased from 1,792 billion USD in 2016 to 3,253 billion USD in 2018. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey, industrial goods are the main 
trade item, followed by agricultural goods, between Canada and Turkey. Industrial 
product exports from Turkey account for 85% of overall exports to Canada while 
industrial product imports from Canada account for 82% of overall imports from Canada.  
 
The EU recently concluded Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan on 1 
February 2019.  This agreement is considered as the biggest trade agreement ever 
negotiated for the EU since it provides an open trade zone for around 635 million people, 
which is almost a third of the world’s GDP. The main aim of this agreement is to liberalize 
trade and investment and promote a closer economic relationship between parties. The 
Agreement includes the elimination of the customs duties, trade in services, rules of origin, 
intellectual property rights and public procurement. 
 
Similar to the CETA, this agreement between the EU and Japan also considers 
Turkey since Japan will be able to export tariff-free products to Turkey while Turkey will 
still be faced to customs duties while exporting products to Japan. According to the EU-
Turkey EPA, all tariffs on automotive products will be eliminated in a period of seven 
years from the entry into force, which is 2019. The FTA negotiations between Turkey and 
Japan still continue and both parties have discussed trade in goods, trade in services, 
government procurement, rules of origin, technical barriers to trade, e-commerce and etc. 
in the latest negotiation that was held in April 2019. One of the biggest reasons to 
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conclude Turkey-Japan FTA is to compensate potential trade diversion that would arise 
due to the EU-Turkey CU.  It is expected by the Turkish ministers is that the Turkey-
Japan FTA will be completed in 2019. 
 
“Turkey revised its FTA policy and started to engage in FTAs that cover goods, 
agriculture and services. For instance, FTAs with South Korea and Singapore (also Japan 
-still under negotiation-) cover a wide range of areas including goods and services and 
investment.”42 The FTA with South Korea is considered to be the first DCFTA of Turkey. 
It includes a Framework Agreement that covers competition, intellectual property rights, 
trade and sustainable development. Under the Framework Agreement, Agreement on 
Trade in Services as well as Agreement on Investment have been signed on February 2015 
and entered into force on August 2018. The current FTA negotiations with Japan, Mexico, 
Peru and Ukraine also include investment and services chapters. 
 
2.1.  FTAs of Turkey, the EU and Comparison 
 
After the establishment of the Customs Union, there have been a great number of 
FTAs concluded by the EU. As mentioned in the previous topics, Turkey has to go 
through different kind process depending upon the regulations of the EU when signing an 
FTA. Firstly, Turkey has to start negotiations and/or sign an FTA with a third country in 
                                               
42 See the report European Commission (2016a). “Impact Assessment.” 
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parallel with the EU. If the EU does not have an FTA with that country, Turkey cannot 
start FTA negotiations even if it has possible economic benefits for both side. 
 
“The EU’s trade agreements have been the major driver of its economic growth. 
Trade agreements bring benefits to people and companies in both partner countries and 
the EU through globalization. The EU has been a significant user of FTAs and region-to-
region negotiations. These fall into a number of categories. There are the Association 
Agreements with the states in southeastern Europe/western Balkans and the Euro-Med 
partners that have been largely motivated by a desire to promote economic development 
and political stability in EU’s near neighborhood. There are the Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states that are largely motivated 
by development policy objectives. Finally, there have been the bilateral FTAs concluded 
with South Africa, Mexico, and Chile and the region-to-region negotiation underway with 
MERCOSUR that have been more commercially motivated. In addition to these full-
fledged FTAs, there is a range of other co-operation agreements, including efforts to 
promote regulatory co-operation with the United States.”43   
 
The Customs Union Agreements eliminates customs duties in bilateral trade 
along with establishing a joint customs tariff for international importers. Similarly, 
Association Agreements, Stabilisation Agreements, (Deep and Comprehensive) Free 
                                               
43 See Woolcock, S. (2007). "European Union policy towards free trade agreements." 
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Trade Agreements and Economic Partnership Agreements remove or reduce customs 
tariff in bilateral trade. And lastly, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements provide a 
general framework for bilateral economic relations as well as leaving customs tariffs as 
they are. As it can be seen from the Table 2 below, the EU has concluded trade agreements 
with 36 different country or regions. 
 
Table 2: The EU Trade Agreements44 
Country (Region) Agreement In force  
1. Albania (Western 
Balkans) 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement 
2009 
2. Algeria Association Agreement 01 September 
2005 
3. Andorra Customs Union 01 January 1991 




5. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Western 
Balkans) 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement 
01 June 2015 
6. Botswana (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
7. Chile Association Agreement and 
Additional Protocol 
01 March 2005 
8. Egypt Association Agreement 01 June 2004 
9. Eswatini (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
                                               
44 Source: European Commission website ( http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/negotiations-and-agreements/) 
 39 
10. Faroe Islands Agreement 01 January 1997 
11. Georgia Association Agreement 01 July 2016 
12. Iceland Economic Area Agreement 1994 
13. Israel Association Agreement 01 June 2000 
14. Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 01 February 
2019 
15. Jordan Association Agreement 01 May 2002 
16. Kosovo (UNSCR 
1244) 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement 
01 April 2016 
17. Lebanon Association Agreement 01 April 2006 
18. Liechtenstein Economic Area Agreement 1995 
19. Lesotho (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
20. Mexico Global Agreement 01 October 
2000 
21. Moldova Association Agreement 01 July 2016 
22. Montenegro (Western 
Balkans) 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement 
01 May 2010 
23. Morocco Association Agreement 01 March 2000 
24. Mozambique (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
25. Namibia (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
26. North Macedonia 
(Western Balkans) 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement 
01 April 2004 
27. Norway Economic Area Agreement 1994 
28. Palestinian Authority Interim Association Agreement 01 July 1997 
29. San Marino Customs Union 01 April 2002 
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30. Serbia (Western 
Balkans) 




31. South Africa Economic Partnership Agreement 05 February 
2018 
32. South Korea Free Trade Agreement 01 July 2016 
33. Switzerland Agreement 01 January 1973 
34. Syria Co-operation Agreement 01 July 1977 
35. Tunisia Association Agreement 01 March 1998 
36. Turkey Customs Union 31 December 
1995 
 
The EU currently has continuous trade negotiations with Australia (Australia 
Agreement), China (EU-China Investment Agreement), India (FTA), Indonesia (FTA), 
Myanmar (Investment Protection Agreement), New Zealand (New Zealand Agreement) 
and Philippines (FTA).  Also, trade agreements that have been signed with Azerbaijan, 
Chile, Mexico, Morocco and Tunisia are currently being updated as following: Update of 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Azerbaijan, Modernized trade part of 
Association Agreement with Chile, Modernization of Global Agreement of Mexico, 
Update of Association Agreement to create a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
with Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey has concluded FTAs with 36 countries in total and 11 
of them were repealed due to the accession of these countries to the EU. These 11 
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countries that were accepted to the EU are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 
Turkey also had FTA with Syria that was signed in 2004 and came into force in 
2007. However, Turkey-Syria FTA was suspended in 2011 due to the Syrian Civil War. 
Lastly, the FTA with Jordan that was signed in 2009 and came into force in 2011 was 
repealed in 2018 due to the infeasibility and unfair trade competition claimed by Jordan.  
Currently, Turkey has 19 FTAs in force as listed below. 
 
Table 3: FTAs of Turkey45 
Country / Union Signed In Force 
1. European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
10 December 1991 1 April 1992 
2.  Albania 22 December 2006 1 May 2008 
3.  Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 July 2002 1 July 2003 
4.  Chile 14 July 2009 1 March 2011 
5.  Egypt 27 December 2005 1 March 2007 
6.  Faroe Islands 16 December 2014 1 October 2017 
7.  Georgia 21 November 2007 1 November 2008 
8.  Israel 14 March 1996 1 May 1997 
9.  Macedonia 7 September 1999 1 September 2000 
10.  Malaysia 17 April 2014 1 August 2015 
11.  Mauritius 9 September 2011 1 June 2013 
                                               
45 Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade website: https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-
agreements 
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12.  Moldova 11 September 2014 1 November 2016 
13.  Montenegro 26 November 2008 1 March 2010 
14.  Morocco 7 April 2004 1 January 2006 
15.  Palestine 20 July 2004 1 June 2005 
16.  Serbia 1 June 2009 1 September 2010 
17.  Singapore 14 November 2015 1 October 2017 
18.  South Korea 1 August 2012 1 May 2013 
19.  Tunisia 25 November 2004 1 July 2005 
  
The FTAs signed with Lebanon, Kosovo, Sudan, Qatar and Venezuela are still 
under ratification process and Turkey has been engaging with trade negotiations actively 
with Japan, Ukraine, Peru, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan, Ghana and Djibouti. 
 
The FTA between EFTA and Turkey was the only FTA that was signed before 
the CU was established between Turkey and the EU and it is considered as the first step 
to adopt preferential regimes of the EU. Also, Malaysia is the only country that has FTA 
with Turkey but not with the EU. Turkey started the FTA negotiations after the EU did 
but the process was faster with Turkey and negotiations resulted with an FTA. 
 
Table 4 shows the signature and entry into force dates of the EU trade agreements 
as well as Turkish FTAs. Turkey starts FTA negotiations or emphasizes its interest in 
negotiating FTA with third parties just after the EU. However, negotiation time and entry 
into force date usually depend on how the negotiations go in the first place. Therefore,  
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there are some special cases where Turkish FTA came into force before the EU’s trade 
agreements with the same country. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Signature and Entry into Force Dates of Turkish FTAs to the EU 
Country / Union EU Turkey 
Signed In force Signed In force 





2.       Albania December 2006 April 2009 December 
2006 
May 2008 
3.       Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
June 2008 June 2015 July 2002 July 2003 
4.       Chile November 2002 March 2005 July 2009 March 2011 
5.       Egypt June 2001 June 2004 December 
2005 
March 2007 
6.       Faroe 
Islands 









8.       Israel November 1995 June 2000 March 1996 May 1997 




10.    Malaysia Negotiations started October 
2010, paused since April 2012 
April 2014 August 2015 






                                               
46 January 1994 for Iceland and Norway, May 1995 for Liechtenstein 
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13.    Montenegro October 2007 May 2010 November 
2008 
March 2010 
14.    Morocco February 1996 March 2000 7 April 2004 January 2006 
15.    Palestine February 1997 July 1997 July 2004 June 2005 
16.    Serbia April 2008 September 
2013 
June 2009 September 
2010 
17.    Singapore October 2018 Waiting November 
2015 
October 2017 
18.    South Korea June 2010 December 
2015 
August 2012 May 2013 




Turkey’s main objective of FTA negotiation is to increase the trade volume 
between both parties. Turkey’s overall export rate was recorded as 449% while overall 
import rate was recorded as 449,5 with its FTA partners in the period of 2000-2012. The 
export value was 1,8 million USD in 2000 and it increased up to 11 billion USD in 2012. 
The higher export rate of the countries that have FTA with Turkey compared to the overall 
export rate in Turkey shows that the market access availability for the FTA partners has 
been increased. Hence, the share of the export with FTA partners in the overall export 
rate in 2000 was 7,9% and it increased to 9,1% in 2012. 
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During the same period of 2000-2012, an overall increase of import rate in Turkey 
was recorded as 334%, while the increase in imports with FTA partners was recorded as 
360%. The overall import value was 1,7 million USD in 2000 and it increased to 4,9 
billion USD in 2012. The import value with FTA partners was 4,1% of overall import 
value in the Turkish economy in 2000 and this rate increased up to 4,3% in 2012. As it 
can be seen from the rates and values, Turkey had faced a trade surplus with 11,2 billion 
USD export value and 4,9 billion USD import value in 2012. 
 
2.2.  Asymmetrical Legal Background of FTAs (Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia Case) 
 
Even though the overall effect of the FTAs has contributed many economic 
benefits to Turkey, plenty of Turkey’s current FTAs are subject to the asymmetrical 
situation at the expense of Turkey. “Accordingly, Turkey’s FTAs usually enforces Turkey 
to abolish tariffs and similar measures as soon as the agreement enters into force while 
allowing the partner country to dismantle its barriers to Turkish products progressively. 
Thus, the liberalization is asymmetrical and induces a time gap in the removal of tariffs 
on Turkish exports up to several years for some product categories following the entry 
into force of the Agreement.” 47   Table 5 shows the time gaps in eliminating tariff 
schedules of Turkish FTAs with Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
 
                                               
47 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on 
Turkey: An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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Table 5: Time gap between entry into force and elimination of duties (Turkey - Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) 
 
Signature Entry into 
force 
Schedule for elimination of 
the customs duties 
Time 
gap 
Egypt 2005 2007 2020 13 
Morocco 2004 2006 2015 9 
Tunisia 2004 2005 2014 9 
 
For example, Turkey-Morocco FTA has been signed on 7 April 2004 and came 
into effect on 1 January 2006. Morocco also has an Association Agreement with the EU 
that came in force in March 2000. In Article 40 of Turkey-Morocco FTA below, customs 
duties and charges having an equivalent effect on imports applicable in Turkey to products 
originating in Morocco shall be abolished upon the entry into force. 
 
“ARTICLE 40 of Morocco-Turkey FTA48 
Entry into force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second 
month, following the date of the receipt of the latter diplomatic note, 
by which the Parties have notified each other through diplomatic 
channels, that their internal legal requirements for the entry into force 
of this Agreement have been fulfilled.” 
 
                                               
48 Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade: https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-
agreements/morocco 
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On the other hand as it can be seen from Table 5, “parallel to the Association 
Agreement between Morocco and the EU, customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect on a group of sensitive industrial products originating from Turkey will be 
dismantled gradually under a period of nine years”.49 
 
As another example, Egypt-Turkey FTA has been signed on 27 December 2005 
and came into force on 1 March 2007 while the Association Agreement between Egypt 
and the EU came in force in June 2004. “Customs duties applied by Turkey on industrial 
goods originating in Egypt have been abolished by the entry into force of the Egypt-
Turkey FTA. On the other hand, as it can be seen from Table 5,  customs duties applied 
by Egypt on the industrial goods originating in Turkey will be abolished gradually until 
1 January 2020 according to the lists provided in Protocol I of the Agreement in line with 
the Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt.”50 
 
Moreover, the Tunisia-Turkey FTA has been signed on 25  November 2004 and 
entered into force on 1 July 2005. “The customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect on imports applicable in Turkey to products originating in Tunisia has been 
abolished upon the entry into force of this Agreement. On the other hand, regarding to the 
goods listed in List I, List II and List III of Protocol I of the Agreement, customs duties 
                                               
49 See Çalışkan, Ö. (2009). "An analysis on the alignment process of Turkey to the EU’s FTAs 
under the customs union and current challenges." 
50 Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-
agreements/egypt  
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applied by Tunisia for the goods originating in Turkey have been eliminated gradually 
until 1 July 2014 in line with the Association Agreement that was came in force on March 
1998 between the EU and Tunisia.”51 
 
 
Figure 4: Turkey’s Trade Balance with FTA Partners (2001-2011)52 
 
Most of Turkey’s FTAs has been signed came into force in between 2001 and 
2011. Figure 4 shows the comparison of the trade balance of all FTAs that came into force 
in 2001 and 2011 and Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia FTA. Total number of FTAs in Figure 
4 includes 11 countries: Albania (entry into force in 2008), Bosnia-Herzegovina (entry 
                                               
51 Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-
agreements/tunisia  
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into force in 2003), Chile (entry into force in 2011), Egypt (entry into force in 2007), 
Georgia (entry into force in 2008), Montenegro (entry into force in 2010), Morocco (entry 
into force in 2006), Palestine (entry into force in 2005), Serbia (entry into force in 2010), 
Tunisia (entry into force in 2005) and lastly Syria (entry into force in 2007). 
 
In the time period of 2001 and 2011, the trade volume has increased with the 
FTAs signed with different countries. As it can be observed from Figure 5, the 
asymmetrical regulations of CU that were found in countries like Morocco, Egypt and 
Tunisia create a slow-paced increase compared to the total increase in trade that comes 




Figure 5: Turkey’s Trade Volume with FTA Partners (2001-2011)53 
 
Similar to the results shown in Figure 4, Figure 5 shows the trade volume of all 
FTAs signed between 2001 and 2011 and FTAs signed with Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. 
Trade volume with Tunisia increased from 214 million USD in 2001 to 475 million USD 
in 2006,  a year after the FTA came into force. Trade volume with Egypt increased from 
513 million USD in 2001 to 2,313 billion USD in 2008,  a year after the FTA came into 
force. Lastly, trade volume with Morocco was lower with 136 million USD in 2001 and 
it increased to 1,318 billion USD in 2007. There was an overall increase in trade volume 
with these three countries. However, compared to the overall trade volume with all FTAs 
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signed in the same period, the trade volume with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt seem to be 
low. The trade volume of FTAs was recorded as 2,187 billion USD while it was recorded 
12,298 billion USD in 2011. 
 
“As it can be seen from the case countries, when the EU FTA partner concluded 
another FTA with Turkey, there was a substantial time span between the entry into force 
of the FTAs with the EU and that of the FTAs with Turkey. These difficulties temporarily 
created market access and competitiveness gap to detriment of Turkey since it could not 
benefit from preferential access to the markets of those EU FTA partners while goods of 











                                               
54 See the report European Commission. (2016a). “Impact Assessment” 
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CHAPTER V: Effects of FTAs 
 
1. Effects of the EU’s FTAs on Turkey 
 
Some of the countries that have concluded an FTA with the EU are not willing to 
have similar trade arrangements with Turkey. In practice, the two motives can be argued 
to explain this reluctance. “First, the third country already gains preferential access into 
the Turkish market indirectly thanks to ‘free circulation’ of its exportables into Turkey 
via the EU. Therefore, there is no logical reason for a sovereign country to open its 
domestic market to Turkish exports in return. Turkey apparently cannot reciprocate by 
raising tariffs to products originating from these countries claiming that the latter 
refrained from proposing similar concessions to Turkish products under a similar FTA. 
This is because Turkey has already agreed to align its customs regime and its customs 
duties to that of the EU. Second, the third country may not be ready to surrender its 
uncompetitive domestic industries if Turkish counterparts are dominant in the relevant 
sectors, even it agrees to initiate a bilateral agreement (i.e. safeguard mechanism or 
sectoral exceptions).”55  While Turkey tries to start negotiations for an FTA with the third 
party that has concluded an FTA with the EU, this time period puts Turkey out of 
countenance and creates asymmetrical market competition. 
 
 
                                               
55 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on 
Turkey: An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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1.1. Mexico Case 
 
Mexico has concluded an FTA with the EU that came into effect in 2000 but there 
is no FTA between Turkey and Mexico. The FTA between the EU and Mexico enabled 
97% tariff-free market between two parties until 2007.  Due to the EU-Turkey CU, 
Mexico is able to export to Turkey without tariff and expose 10% to 20% tariffs for the 
imports that come from Turkey. Because of this advantageous position, Mexico does not 
seem to conclude another FTA with Turkey. 
 
The trade agreement between the EU and Mexico creates an unfair competitive 
advantage for the EU products against Turkish products in the Mexican market and 
increases the competition conditions of Mexican products in the EU market unilaterally. 
Additionally, Mexico is able to export products to Turkey through the EU and this creates 
unfair competition and financial losses for Turkey. 56  Figure 6 shows the export and 
import values along with trade balance with Mexico. The trade balance with Mexico in 
2001, 2002 and 2004 shows a trade surplus while the rest of the years show trade deficit 
in Turkey. The figure also shows that the trade deficit has continued to rise especially 
after 2005. The overall exports to Mexico have increased 5 times while the overall imports 
from Mexico have increased 16 times in the period between 2000 and 2012. 
 
                                               




Figure 6: Trade Balance of Turkey with Mexico (2000-2017)57 
 
Due to the global crisis in 2008, total imports of Turkey has decreased by 
approximately 44% from 202 billion USD to 140 billion USD in 2009. During the same 
period, imports from Mexico has decreased by 13% from 382 million USD to 335 million 
USD. Exports of Turkey to Mexico has increased around 30% from 238 million USD to 
312 million USD in 2014 compared to 2013. However, imports of Turkey from Mexico 
started to decrease 5,6% from 1 billion USD to 944,7 million USD in the same years. 
According to Turkish statistics, Turkey had a trade deficit of 637,7 million USD in 2014. 
On the other hand, Mexican statistics claim that exports of Turkey to Mexico had 
increased 21,2% to 639,1 million USD while imports of Turkey from Mexico has 
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decreased 8,5% to 327,8 million USD in the same years. According to the Mexican 
statistics, Turkey had a trade surplus with 311,3 million USD in 2014. 
 
The biggest reason behind the increase in imports of Turkey from Mexico is that 
the Mexican products started to enter Turkey tariff free due to the FTA that came into 
force between the EU and Mexico. Mexican companies that have a trade relationship with 
Turkey use the EU countries as a road in order to enable tariff-free trade with Turkey. 
Because of the EU-Mexico FTA, Mexico started to change the import sources in industrial 
products to the EU countries. For instance, imports of the motor vehicle parts from Turkey 
in 2000 increased 91% from 7.000.000 USD in 2006, then decreased again around 100% 
to 7.000.000 USD in 2008. During this period, imports of the motor vehicle parts from 
the EU in 2000 increased from 1.143 million USD to 2.3 million USD in 2009. The export 
value of motor vehicle parts of Mexico to EU was 16,5% of total exports and it increased 
to 22% in 2008. 
 
Mexico exports tariff-free motor vehicle parts to Turkey while Turkey is exposed 
to %15 tariff in order to export the same product to Turkey. In other words, Turkey sells 
the same product 15% more expensive. Additionally, Mexico was importing fiber and 
carpet products from Turkey but they started to import the same products from the EU 
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after signing an FTA agreement. Specially Turkish carpets became 30% more expensive 
compared to the ones from the EU. 58 
 
In conclusion, the trade deficit of Turkey kept increasing after the EU-Mexico 
trade agreement which enabled Mexico to penetrate Turkish market tariff-free because of 
the EU-Turkey CU. The negotiations for Turkey-Mexico FTA is still ongoing since 2014. 
It is expected that Turkey-Mexico FTA will not only eliminate tariffs on goods and 
services but also result in a greater flow of capital investment between the two countries. 
 
1.2.  South Africa Case 
 
The foundation of the trade relations of South Africa and the EU was the Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement that was concluded in 1999. This agreement 
established a free trade area over a transitional period of maximum 12 years on the South 
African side and maximum 10 years on the EU side. The free trade area between the EU 
and South Africa covers free movement of goods in all sectors and it provides trade 
liberalization in services. Trade relations between South Africa and Turkey has started in 
1966 and stared to rise specially after 1981. After 2000s, Turkey’s strategic approach in 
foreign trade relations as well as  South Africa’s movements in open trade has contributed 
an increase in the trade volume between two countries.  
                                               
58 See Ö zen, A. B. (2016). "Avrupa Birliği Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmalarının Türkiye Üzerine 
Yansımaları (Reflections of European Union FTAs on Turkey)." 
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Figure 7: Trade Volume, Trade Balance, Export and Import Values of Turkey with South Africa (2000-
2011)59 
 
Figure 7 shows export, import, trade volume and trade balance values in the 
period of eleven years after the signature of the EU-South Africa trade agreement. It can 
be observed that imports from South Africa kept increasing from 171 million USD in 
2000 to 2,1 billion USD in 2007. Both trade volume and imports from South Africa have 
been effected by the global crisis in the following years. However, Turkey managed to 
scale down trade balance in between 2008-2009 by increasing its exports to South Africa 
approximately 600% from 123 million USD to 866 million USD. Turkey was never able 
to reach to that value from its exports to South Africa and trade deficit of Turkey kept 
increasing after 2011. 
                                               
59 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Annual trade balance and volume by country, import by 
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Similar with the previous cases, Turkey faces unfair competitiveness since 
products from South Africa can enter Turkish market tariff-free while products from 
Turkey are exposed to high tariff rates in South Africa. The necessity for establishing an 
FTA between South Africa and Turkey has been discussed in several meetings, such as 
Turkey-South Africa Business Forum. However, South Africa prefers to keep the 
advantageous situation and avoid signing an FTA with Turkey. 
 
Table 6: Imports and Exports of Turkey and South Africa (2010-2017)60 
 
Turkey South Africa 
 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
2010 1,855,443 1,138,832 968,354 913,472 
2011 2,408,416 1,349,068 1,244,300 1,088,146 
2012 2,365,451 1,524,617 1,271,541 996,059 
2013 2,516,612 1,518,026 1,263,300 961,534 
2014 2,421,770 1,576,100 1,219,500 930,433 
2015 2,072,340 1,438,390 1,046,510 808,654 
2016 1,986,180 1,425,300 915,923 763,147 
2017 2,338,000 1,569,930 1,013,260 888,372 
 
Table 6 shows the total export and imports values of Turkey and South Africa in 
million USD in the period of 2010-2017. Turkey’s trade volume in world trade was 29,5 
billion USD while South Africa’s trade volume was 16,2 billion USD in the period of 
                                               
60 Source: WTO statistics 
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E 
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2010-2017. Additionally, Turkey’s imports and exports have increased around 0,5% and 
0,4% respectively while South Africa’s imports have increased 0,1% but exports have 
decreased around 0,1% in 2017. It can be concluded from the data that Turkey’s 
competitiveness in world trade is higher than South Africa’s. Turkey’s competitiveness 
would increase even higher if both parties agree on establishing an FTA. 
 
2. Effects of the FTAs concluded by Turkey after the EU 
 
 
Turkey tries to start FTA negotiations to conclude a separate agreement after the 
EU starts negotiations and/or concludes trade agreement with a third party. Even though 
Turkey starts the FTA negotiations just after the EU does, there is usually a time gap, that 
varies from two to ten years, between the trade agreements of EU and Turkey with third 
parties. This time period puts Turkey out of countenance and creates  asymmetrical 
market competition most of the times. Therefore, Turkey tries to conclude the 
negotiations as soon as possible after the EU establishes a trade agreement with a third 
party. It is really important for Turkey to establish an FTA with a third party that also 
concluded an FTA with the EU because concluding an FTA separately usually helps 
Turkey to recover trade deficit.  
 
2.1.  South Korea Case 
 
The EU-South Korea FTA, which is considered as a new generation FTA that 
enables more comprehensive in scope than the EU’s previous bilateral trade agreements, 
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was signed in 2010, provisionally applied after 2011 and came into force in 2015. Turkey 
started negotiations with South Korea FTA in parallel with the EU and signed an FTA on 
August 2012. Consequently, South Korea-Turkey FTA came into effect on May 2013. In 
the first year of EU-Korea FTA, 94% of all EU tariff lines were liberalized equivalent to 
about 90% of the value of Korean exports to the EU.  
 
On the other hand, Turkey-Korea FTA shows that the Korean liberalization is 80% 
equivalent to 65% of the value of EU exports to Turkey. 90% of liberalization will be 
ensured on tariff elimination until January 2023. Turkey-Korea FTA requires Turkey to 
take seven years to abolish its import tariffs on industrial products from South Korea 
while the EU has agreed to take five years. The asymmetries on the legal background of 
FTAs can also be seen in the EU-South Korea and South Korea-Turkey FTAs. 
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Figure 8: Export and Import Values of Turkey with South Korea (2000-2018)61 
 
Figure 8 shows the export and import values of Turkey with South Korea in the 
period of 2000-2018. It can be clearly seen that the trade volume between the two 
countries kept increasing, yet Turkey has been facing a high value of trade deficit. 
Especially in the time period between 2002 and 2008, the trade deficit of Turkey has 
increased around 350%. Trade between South Korea and Turkey has been affected by the 
global crisis that caused a decrease in imports from South Korea between 2008 and 2009. 
After the signature of the FTA between the EU and South Korea in 2010, imports from 
South Korea has increased expeditiously from 4,7 billion USD to 6,2 billion USD. After 
the signature of Turkey-Korea FTA, Korea’s export has increased around 2,3% in 2014 
                                               























































































and 20,9% in 2015 compared to the previous year. The trade volume has increased by 
approximately 66% from 4,3 billion USD to 7,2 billion USD in the past ten years. 
 
Table 7: Turkey's export volume to South Korea after FTA62 
Years 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Exports 460,050 470,463 568,635 518,774 584,114 929,106 
 
Table 7 shows the export volume of Turkey to South Korea in thousand USD 
after the FTA between South Korea and Turkey came into effect in 2013. The values are 
still very low compared to imports coming from South Korea, however, it can be seen 
that the FTA contributed approximately 98% increase in exports of Turkey to South Korea 
from 460 million USD to 929 million USD. In other words, FTA increased Turkey’s 
competition while trading with South Korea. 
 
In 2007, 15,28% of the total automotive imports of the EU came from South 
Korea, while it was 17,85% of total automotive imports to Turkey from South Korea. It 
shows the importance that Turkey-South Korea FTA was meant to be signed in order to 
maintain the competitiveness of Turkey specially in the automotive industry which has a 
bigger importance for Turkey compared to the EU. 
                                               




Figure 9: South Korea's Import Share and Import Values in Turkey (2009-2018)63 
 
South Korea was ranked as the 10th country that imports Turkey the most with 
6,3 billion USD in 2018. Figure 9 shows that after South Korea-Turkish FTA, imports of 
Turkey from South Korea has never decreased below 6 billion USD that was recorded in 
2013. After the FTA, South Korea’s import share in Turkey’s total imports has increased 
around 41% from 2,4% to 3,4%. In conclusion, Turkey’s imports from South Korea has 
been always higher than Turkey’s exports to South Korea. However, after singing Turkey-
South Korea FTA, there has been an increase around 100% observed in Turkey’s exports 
in South Korea. In conclusion, if Turkey-South Korea FTA has not been signed, it would 
create bigger trade deficits and uncompetitive trade for Turkey because the EU-South 
                                               
63 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Annual imports by country): 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=625  
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Korea FTA would enable South Korea to export tariff-free while Turkey would still face 
tariffs while exporting to South Korea. 
 
2.2.  Chile Case 
 
Association Agreement between Chile and the EU provides a comprehensive 
FTA that removes tariffs and trade barriers and enables protection for European 
intellectual property in Chile. After it came into force in 2005, customs duties on 
industrial product imports to the EU were completely eliminated in three years while 
customs duties on the industrial product to Chile were completely eliminated in seven 
years. Table 8 shows the trade balance and trade volume of Turkey with Chile in the 
period before and after the Mexico-EU trade agreement, which came into force in 2005, 
in thousand USD. 






























































Exports 16 19 19 15 24 24 34 41 150 37 81 130 
Imports 92 73 79 160 176 326 441 533 324 200 311 474 
Trade 
Balance 
-76 -54 -59 -145 -152 -301 -407 -492 -174 -163 -230 -344 
                                               





108 93 99 176 201 351 477 576 474 238 393 605 
 
It can be seen from the table that especially after two years from 2005, the trade 
deficit has increased around 63%. The imports from Chile to Turkey in 2005 increased 
around 85% from 176 million USD to 326 million USD while the exports remained the 
same. The exports from Turkey to Chile ranked highest around 150 million USD in 2008. 
105 million USD out of 150 million USD was the exports of iron and steel products that 
resulted in a lower trade deficit for Turkey. Additionally, trade volume between the two 
countries in 2008 and 2009 has shown a decrease after a continuous increase in previous 
years due to the global crisis. 
 
Turkey has signed an FTA with Chile in 2009 and it came into force in 2011. The 
Chile-Turkey FTA includes “removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in trade between 
Chile and Turkey; structural adjustment; animal and plant health; intellectual, industrial 
and commercial property rights; rules and certificate of origin; national taxation; anti-
dumping and lastly safeguard measures and balance of payments.” Chile and Turkey also 
agreed to expand the scope of the FTA to cover trade in services in 2013. Table 9 shows 
the export and import values as well as trade balance and trade volume in thousand USD 
after the Chile-Turkey FTA came into force. 
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Table 9: Trade Balance and Trade Volume of Turkey with Chile (2011-2018)65 
Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Exports 130 174 219 198 187 217 255 386 
Imports 474 466 405 363 282 233 265 370 
Trade 
Balance 
-344 -291 -187 -165 -95 -16 -10 16 
Trade 
Volume 
605 641 625 562 470 450 520 757 
 
It can be clearly seen from the table that the trade deficit has continuously 
decreased and eventually Turkey showed a trade surplus in 2018. In conclusion, the EU-
Chile FTA has enabled Chile to import tariff-free products and this created a big trade 
deficit for Turkey because Turkey was not able to have reciprocal access to Chile. 
However, after Turkey-Chile FTA, the trade deficit of Turkey has decreased and became 
a trade surplus in 2018. 
 
3. Comparison of the EU Customs Unions (San Marino and 
Andorra) 
 
The EU has two different Customs Union that is has been signed with two 
different countries: Andorra and San Marino. Andorra is a small country that is located in 
the middle of France and Spain. It is the 6th smallest country in the European continent 
                                               
65 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Annual trade balance and volume by country): 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=625  
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and 16th smallest in the world with a population of around eighty thousand. Tourism and 
retail trade are the main sources of the economy in Andorra. According to the World Bank 
data, the GDP in Andorra decreased to $3.013 billion after 2007. Andorra is considered 
as a rich country with per capita income that is above the EU standards. 
 
According to Central Intelligence Agency, “Andorra has opened to foreign 
investment and engaged in other reforms, such as advancing tax initiatives aimed at 
supporting a broader infrastructure. Although not a member of the EU, Andorra enjoys a 
special relationship with the bloc that is governed by various customs and cooperation 
agreements and uses the euro as its national currency.” 
 
The exports of Andorra are higher than its imports, which is why the country is 
experiencing a great trade deficit. As it can be seen from the Table 10, regionally Europe 
is the main trade area for Andorra with almost 91% of total import and 83,5% of total 
export volume. The EU is Andorra’s main trade partner while Spain accounts more than 
half of the trade in the country. Apart from European region, America and Asia slightly 





Table 10: Andorran Foreign Trade by Geographical Areas (2017)66 
 Imports Exports 
M euros % total M euros % total 
Europe 1,189.10 90.9 88.6 83.4 
America 21.2 1.6 2.7 2.6 
Asia 83 6.3 7.1 6.7 
 
The economic relationship between Andorra and the EU started with the CU 
agreement. The CU between the Principality of Andorra and the EU (European Economic 
Community during that time) has been established for the industrial products in 1990. The 
CU Agreement eliminates the customs duties, charges having equivalent effect and 
quantitative restrictions in trade between the EU, Andorra and third countries in the 
customs union. The agricultural products are not covered in the CU between Andorra and 
the EU, however, the agreement has established a specific regime for the agricultural 
products. 
 
Following the CU Agreement, Cooperation agreement has been signed in 2004. 
The main objective of this agreement is to provide cooperation on the broadest possible 
and mutual advantage in matters of common interest, such as the communication, 
information and culture, the environment, trans-European networks and transport, 
regional policy and etc. In the same year, Taxation of Savings agreement has been signed 
between both parties. “The agreement provides for a staged increase in the withholding 
                                               
66 Source: The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services of Andorra 
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tax from 15 to 20 and 35% over a number of years, with three-quarters of the tax revenues 
to be returned to the country of residence of the saver.”67 Monetary Agreement has been 
signed in 2011, allowing Andorra to use euro as legal currency and mint euro coins up to 
a specified maximum value. 
 
The CU between Andorra and the EU is generally seemed to be functioning well 
even if problems occur sometimes. The European Commission and the Joint Committee 
of Andorra meet once a year to find a solution to these problems. The full membership of 
the EU seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. The government of Andorra and several 
ministers have stated that there is no need to join the EU. However, it is obvious that 
Andorra should keep the relations with the EU active to be included in the European 
market and enhance the economy by exporting its products and providing services for the 
EU. 
San Marino, a country located in the lands of Italy, is the 5th smallest country in 
the world and smallest independent state in Europe after Vatican City and Monaco. San 
Marino is considered as one of the wealthiest countries in the world because of the rate of 
GDP per capita around fifty-nine thousand dollars. The economy in San Marino depends 
mainly on tourism, electronics, manufacture, and banking. The manufacture and banking 
sectors account for more than half of the country’s GDP. As expected, Italy is the main 
trade partner of San Marino with around 80% of total exports. 
                                               
67 See Emerson, M. (2007). “Andorra and the European Union” 
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The diplomatic relationship between San Marino and the EU started in 1983 with 
the cooperation and talks about security, human rights policies. The current legal 
framework between the EU and San Marino consists of three agreements: The 
Cooperation and CU Agreement, Monetary Agreement and lastly Agreement on taxations 
of savings income. The Cooperation and CU Agreement has been signed in 1991 with the 
aim of strengthening the economic and social relations and promoting comprehensive 
cooperation between two parties. The Monetary Agreement has been signed in 2000, 
allowing San Marino to use the euro as its official currency. Agreement of taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payment has been signed in 2004 to secure the 
adaptation by San Marino of equivalent measures to those applied by the EU. The current 
government of San Marino is taking actions for a better and closer relationship with the 
EU. There have been several diplomatic and political meetings regarding the future 
membership and greater integration of San Marino to the EU. 
 
In order to understand the differences in the Customs Unions of Andorra, San 
Marino, and Turkey, it is better to understand the main differences of the countries first. 
Three countries differ in many aspects including their participation in world trade and the 
size of their economies. The biggest foundational difference between Andorra, San 
Marino, and Turkey is the market size. There is a big gap in the size of the countries and 
population. Andorra’s population has been rising and decreasing mainly due to the 
migration. As it can be seen in Table 11, San Marino has the lowest population with 
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around 33,400 in 2017 compared to Andorra and Turkey. Andorran population has been 
recorded as 76.965 with more than twice of the size of the population in San Marino. 
 
Table 11: Population of San Marino, Andorra and Turkey (2012-2017)68 
Series 
Name 





31,914 32,303 32,657 32,960 33,203 33,400 
Populati
on, total 
















Turkish population, on the other hand, has been increasing progressively in the 
past years due to the high fertility and migration rate. As it can be seen in the Table 11, 
Turkish population has ranked almost 81 million. Even Bayburt, the least populous city 
in Turkey, has more number of citizens with approximately 80,500  compared to the 
whole population of Andorra. Even by looking only to the population of two countries, it 
can be easily estimated that the functional progress of the CU of two countries work 
different because of the market size. The export volume of Andorra and Turkey is also 
really different as expected. The export volume index in Andorra has ranked 213 while it 
ranked 388 in Turkey in 2017. 
                                               
68 Source: World Bank data 
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While Andorra is free of the customs duties, only the agricultural products are 
subject to import duties if they’re not certified as Andorran origin. On the other hand, the 
Agreement with San Marino and the EU covers all products of HS Chapters 1 to 97 except 
for the coal and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty. However, unlike Turkey, 
Andorra and San Marino did not conclude any FTAs with any countries. Since the main 
trade partner of Andorra is located in the EU, such as Spain, France and Germany, and 
Italy for San Marino’s case, both countries seem to not in need of FTAs with third 
countries.  
 
The official agreement of the CU that was established between the EU and Turkey 
is substantially short compared to the regulation of the CU between the EU and Turkey. 
The CU of Andorra and San Marino does not mention anything about the FTAs unlike 
the CU between Turkey and the EU. However, it mentions the common provisions and 
arrangements for products that are not covered by the CU similar to the EU-Turkey CU. 
When the EU concludes FTAs with third countries, there is a joint declaration at the end 
of the Origin Protocol providing that products originating in the Republic of San Marino 
and/or Principality of Andorra shall be accepted by the third country concerned as 
originating in the Community/EU within the meaning of the Agreement.  Andorra and 
San Marino have been successfully negotiated in all recent FTAs concluded by the EU.  
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CHAPTER VI: Solving the FTA Problem and Role of 
the EU 
 
1. Actions and Possible Attempts to Solve FTA Asymmetry 
Problem 
Modernization of the EU-Turkey CU has been argued in many studies, including 
the Turkish government, the European Commission and World Bank studies. Most of 
these arguments support that the FTA asymmetrical problem can be avoided by 
modernizing the current CU. Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004) argues that “feasible 
solutions can be found to FTA problems, which prevent unnecessary friction between the 
customs union partners or a perceived trade diversion and export impediment for the 
Turkish side.” Again, they emphasize that a feasible solution should be found for both 
parties and they suggest that “with respect to adopting FTAs by Turkey, the EU must 
undertake a significant effort to alleviate the concerns of the Turkish side in terms of the 
policy dependency framework, particularly in relation to the development of a genuinely 
common commercial policy. Yet both the EU and Turkey must start to address this issue 
in more imaginative ways so as to bring workable, adaptable and flexible solutions to the 
core problems of policy dependency and institutional cooperation.”69 
 
                                               
69 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 
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“If an efficient mechanism is not set up to ensure proper cooperation and 
consultation between the parties, the new initiative of EU to FTAs will further complicate 
the present problems and undermine the proper functioning of CU. Obviously, there are 
some negative political and economic ramifications of this situation on the overall 
relations between EU and Turkey.”70 
 
In the World Bank (2014a) document, it is emphasized that “while the first best 
solution would be to move forward with accession negotiations, other actions could be 
taken in the meantime to reduce the impacts of asymmetries, such as establishing ‘Friends 
of Turkey’ working groups, and increasing Turkish representation on comitology 
committees.”71 Yalcin, E., et al. (2016) point out on their study that “Turkey is in a poor 
position to negotiate its own free trade agreements with the EU’s new free-trade partners 
in order to overcome the threat of imbalance. Various political alignment options are 
currently being discussed in Turkey, although it is questionable whether some of the 
proposals can be accomplished in a timely manner.”72 According to their study four 
scenarios are possible over the coming years:  EU membership for Turkey, (ii) Adoption 
of EU mandate for Turkey, (iii) Rollback of the customs union to a free trade agreement,  
A more comprehensive customs union. However, the EU membership of Turkey seems 
                                               
70 See Çalışkan, Ö. (2009). "An analysis on the alignment process of Turkey to the EU’s FTAs 
under the customs union and current challenges." 
71 See the report World Bank (2014a). Evaluation of the EU - TURKEY Customs Union (85830-
TR) 
72 See Yalcin, E., et al. (2016). “Turkey’s EU integration at a crossroads.” 
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very unlikely due to the negative political dialogs and current situation of Turkey.  The 
other scenarios might work out better than current CU but they all require a certain 
commitment from the EU. 
 
As mentioned before, the EU is currently in negotiations for deeper trade 
agreements with the impasse in the Doha Round for multilateral trade negotiations. The 
cost of the FTA asymmetries will increase with deeper trade agreements with big markets. 
When the EU concludes an FTA with a third party, it considers not only the members of 
the EU but also Turkey since it is a customs area. This is why upgrading and modernizing 
the CU will be more important for Turkey. Both the Turkish government and the EU 
recognize the shortcomings of the CU, including the FTA asymmetry problem and agreed 
on modernizing and updating the CU. In 2015, the European Commission and the Turkish 
government have officially started the negotiations on CU modernization. However, it is 
unclear to what extent it will be accomplished.   
 
The EU must consider negotiations about the FTA problem and provide a better 
solution that works for both parties. As Erzan, R. (2018) highlights, “from the EU’s point 
of view, the commercial ties with Turkey are not easily dispensable either. Turkey is EU's 
4th largest export market and 5th largest provider of imports. With a back of the envelope 
calculation based on the Commission’s estimates for overall job creation of EU’s external 
trade, exports to Turkey could be worth about 1.5 million jobs. Furthermore, on average, 
every €1 billion additional exports would be generating about 14,000 jobs in the EU. The 
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European Parliament (EP) has adopted a new resolution on the EU-Turkey relations in 
2016.”73 Therefore, the modernization of the CU has a big importance in the bilateral 
trade between two parties and accession process of Turkey to the EU.  
 
Akman, M. S. (2010) underlines that “the operation of the Customs Union 
became a target for criticism mainly because of the impasse at Turkey-EU relations. 
Therefore, further steps to consider Turkish interests in the formulation of EU FTAs with 
third countries can alleviate such justifiable criticism in Turkey. At this point, two 
different but related avenues of action seem contributive. First, the institutional 
mechanism should be restructured to take into consideration of Turkey’s interests 
accordingly in order to diminish unfavorable effect of change in EU trade policy. Second, 
extension of the customs union into areas such as agriculture and trade in services shall 







                                               
73 See Erzan, R. (2018). "Customs Union between EU and Turkey: A Success Story to be 
Nurtured." 
74 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on 
Turkey: An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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2. What have been done so far? 
 
2.1.  Joint Declaration (Turkey Clause) 
 
 
In order to prevent trade deflection in Turkish side, the EU started to introduce a 
‘Turkey Clause’ in its new trade agreements. Turkey Clause asks its trading partner to 
negotiate and conclude a similar agreement with Turkey. As Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis 
(2004) point out, “a suggestion to conclude similar bilateral trade agreement may be to 
invoke a new sort of conditionality, whereby the ratification of the free trade agreement 
between the EU and a third country could be made conditional to the conclusion of a free 
trade agreement with Turkey.”75 The joint declaration is usually for the countries that have 
CU with the EU, including San Marino and Andorra besides Turkey. However, the 
objective of joint declaration is to initiate third countries to engage in FTAs with Turkey 
since San Marino and Andorra does not have any FTA agreements. Table 12 and 13 show 
the Joint Declaration example of the EU. Table 12 shows the Annex 30-D of The 
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada.  
 
                                               
75 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 
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Table 12: Joint Declaration of Canada-EU trade agreement76 
“JOINT DECLARATION OF THE PARTIES ON COUNTRIES THAT HAVE 
ESTABLISHED A CUSTOMS UNION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1. The European Union recalls the obligations of the countries that have 
established a customs union with the European Union to align their trade regime 
to that of the European Union, and for certain of them, to conclude preferential 
agreements with countries that have preferential agreements with the European 
Union. 
2. In this context, Canada shall endeavour to start negotiations with the 
countries which, 
have established a customs union with the European Union, and 
whose goods do not benefit from the tariff concessions under this Agreement, 
with a view to conclude a comprehensive bilateral agreement establishing a free 
trade area in accordance with the relevant WTO Agreement provisions on goods 
and services, provided that those countries agree to negotiate an ambitious and 
comprehensive agreement comparable to this Agreement in scope and ambition. 
Canada shall endeavour to start negotiations as soon as possible with a view to 
have such an agreement enter into force as soon as possible after the entry into 
force of this Agreement.” 
 
                                               
76 Source: EUR-Lex website: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0470 (COUNCIL DECISION on the provisional 
application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada of the one 
part, and the European Union and its Member States) 
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In the first part, it is clearly mentioned that Turkey has to align its trade regime 
to that of the EU and adopt the common commercial policy towards Canada. Also, it was 
mentioned that Turkey should start negotiations and/or conclude an FTA with Canada. 
Second part invites Canada to start FTA negotiations with Turkey as soon as possible. 
Accordingly, Turkey indicated its interest in pursuing an FTA with Canada in 2009. 
However, there is no concrete result shows that Canada is also willing to start FTA 
negotiations with Turkey. 
 
Table 13 shows the example of a joint declaration in the Japan-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement. Similar to the joint declaration in CETA, it is mentioned that 
Turkey has to align its trade regime to that of the EU and adopt the common commercial 
policy towards Japan. However, unlike Canada, Japan has already started negotiations 
with Turkey at the time the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement was entered into 
force in February 2019. Therefore, this joint declaration invites Japan to conclude 
negotiations and sign an FTA with Turkey as soon as possible. Consequently, negotiations 
between Japan and Turkey regarding an FTA has been going smoothly and it is estimated 
that the Japan-Turkey FTA will be signed in June prior to the G20 summit. 
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Table 13: Joint Declaration of Japan-EU trade agreement77 
“JOINT DECLARATION 
The European Union recalls the obligations of third countries that have 
established a customs union with the European Union to align their trade regimes 
to that of the European Union and, for some of them, to conclude preferential 
agreements with countries that have entered into preferential agreements with the 
European Union. 
In this context, the Parties note that Japan has already started negotiations with 
one of those countries which have established a customs union with the 
European Union and whose products do not benefit from the tariff concessions 
under this Agreement, with a view to concluding a bilateral agreement 
establishing a free trade area in accordance with Article XXIV of GATT 1994. 
The European Union invites Japan to conclude negotiations as soon as possible 
with a view to having the above mentioned preferential agreements enter into 
force as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Agreement.” 
 
Even though the Commission has been advising countries to negotiate an FTA 
with Turkey, they have been unsuccessful so far. Turkey Clause was first used in the EU’s 
negotiations with Algeria in 2005, but it failed to persuade Algeria to negotiate FTA with 
Turkey. The EU simply cannot force third countries to conclude negotiations with Turkey 
because Turkish Clause is not a part of the EU’s negotiation mandate. As it can be seen 
                                               
77 Source: EUR-Lex website: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018PC0192 (COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion of 
the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Japan) 
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from the example of South Africa-EU FTA case, Turkey Clause is sometimes dropped 
from the negotiations. However, as Akman, M. S. (2010) implies, “this can only have an 
economic meaning in the case of countries whose market is constantly or potentially 
significant for Turkish interests. Paradoxically these are the countries in which the EU 
will be least responsive because the addition of Turkish stake into EU’s interests function 
may not yield a gain for the EU itself.”78 The South Korea-EU FTA shows that Turkey 
Clause has provided impetus to the process as within six months and consequently South 
Korea has agreed to negotiate an FTA with Turkey.  
 
Additionally, as it was mentioned in the Comparison of EU Customs Unions part, 
the EU concludes a joint declaration at the end of the Origin Protocol providing that 
products originating in the Republic of San Marino and/or Principality of Andorra shall 
be accepted by the third country concerned as originating in the Community/EU within 
the meaning of the Agreement. The recognition of Andorra and San Marino have been 
successfully negotiated in all recent FTAs concluded by the EU, however, this declaration 
does not always work for Turkey. The Government of Turkey has provided the European 
Commission a mandate to negotiate a strengthened Turkey Clause with the aim of a way 
to ensure the parallel track for the future EU FTAs. Revised Turkey Clause is as follows: 
 
                                               
78 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on 
Turkey: An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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Table 14: Example of revised Turkey Clause by Turkish Government79 
“Example of revised Turkey Clause (Joint Declaration Concerning Turkey) 
The EU recalls the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey based on the 
principle of free movement of goods, whereas goods originating in third 
countries can freely circulate between Turkey and the EU once all import 
formalities are completed in Turkey or in the EU, and the requirement of the 
parties within the Customs Union to apply common commercial policies 
including preferential trade agreements and the common customs tariff in 
accordance with Article XXIV of the GATT. 
In this context, the EU and [FTA partner] have declared as follows: 
1. [FTA partner] and Turkey shall conclude an FTA between the two parties 
on a mutually advantageous basis, to enter into force simultaneously with the 
entry into force of the agreement between the EU and [FTA partner]. 
2. If the agreement between the EU and [FTA partner] enters into force before 
the agreement between [FTA partner] and Turkey, products originating in 
Turkey falling within Chapters 25 to 97 of the Harmonized System and which 
are in free circulation in the EU shall be accepted by [FTA partner] as 
originating in the EU within the meaning of this Agreement, until the entry 
into force of the FTA between [FTA partner] and Turkey. 
3. The rules established to define the originating status of the products subject to 
this Agreement shall apply mutandis for the purpose of defining the originating 
status of the products mentioned in paragraph 2.” 
 
                                               
79 Ministry of Economy, Government of Turkey. 
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It is specifically mentioned in the revised declaration that third countries that 
conclude an FTA with the EU shall also conclude a separate FTA with Turkey that enters 
into force simultaneously. Turkey tries to avoid trade deficits that are caused by the new 
trade partners of the EU since they can enter the Turkish market tariff-free while Turkey 
is still exposed to tariffs while exporting to those countries. Another emphasis Turkish 
government makes is that if it takes longer for Turkey to conclude an FTA with the third 
party after the EU, the third party shall treat products originating in Turkey exactly same 
with those of the EU. In other words, third parties shall use the same tariff schedule 
towards Turkey exactly the same with the EU. Along the same line, Turkey tries to 
prevent possible trade deficit that is caused due to the asymmetrical tariff schedule. 
 
3. What can be done in the future? 
 
3.1.  Joint Negotiations 
 
In order to avoid the asymmetries in the FTA process, one of the best solutions 
would be to have a single and joint negotiation because FTA problems mainly arise from 
the fact that Turkey does not have right to participate the EU’s decision-making process. 
In other words, Turkey cannot take part in the formation of the EU’s common commercial 
policy towards third parties. “An effective procedure could be implemented to allow 
Turkey to have observer status in the Council meetings discussing trade negotiations, or 
in Committee 133, where the EU’s common negotiation position is determined, 
particularly when decisions are made in areas directly related to the customs union with 
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Turkey.”80 “This would enable future FTAs to be negotiated and concluded to include 
truly common arrangements and measures to ensure the integrity of the common 
commercial policy and prevent any possibility of trade deflection.”81 
 
World Bank (2014a) report suggests that “there would be greater institutional 
commonality in terms of decision making regarding the common commercial policy as it 
relates to the under the joint negotiation.”82 When the EU negotiates an FTA, Turkey 
could participate in the Trade Policy Committee and have a vote. This would ensure the 
integrity and eliminate any possible trade deflection. Even though joint negotiation seems 
like a good idea to solve this problem, the EU do not allow a joint negotiation with a non-
EU country because of the institutional realties. The trade negotiations are carried out by 
the Commission that gives mandate to set up a Council Working Group from twenty eight 
member states. The Commission cannot engage in negotiations on behalf of a non-EU 
country. 
 
3.2.  Enhanced Commercial Framework 
 
In 2016, the European Commission has announced two different studies 
regarding the modernization of the CU. One of them was the Impact Assessment that 
                                               
80 See Ö zer, Y. (2019). "External differentiated integration between Turkey and the European 
Union: the customs union and its revision." 
81 See Nas, Ç . and Y. Ö zer (2017). “Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles” 
82 See World Bank. (2014a). “Evaluation of the EU - TURKEY Customs Union (85830-TR)” 
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authorizes to open negotiations with Turkey for extending the scope of the bilateral 
preferential trade relationship. The other one was the final report on the EU-Turkey BPTF 
and its possible enhancement. In the second report, one of the solutions to modernize CU 
was the Enhanced Commercial Framework (ECF). ECF is described as the CU with no 
scope change except the industrial products. The Coal and Steel Agreement (CSA) and 
an FTA cover trade in agriculture and fishery products, services and establishment, non-
tariff barriers and public procurement. In other words, ECT represents a continued and 
scope unchanged CU (only institutionally enhanced) with CSA and FTA covering trade 
in agriculture and fishery products, non-tariff barriers, services and establishment as well 
as public procurement. This option requires strong political dialogues from both the EU 
and Turkey because of strong commitments that come with enhancement.  
 
As Erzan, R. (2018) points out, “this benign scenario generates a GDP increase 
of about 1.5% for Turkey. This figure goes up to 2% or higher if Turkey manages to 
secure FTAs with its other major trade partners. The GDP impact on EU in percentage 
terms appears small due to EU’s sheer size. However, in absolute terms, this effect is 
substantial, about half of the amount that incurs to Turkey. In their bilateral trade, both 
Turkey and particularly the EU make important gains in exports. Turkey also substantially 
expands exports to third parties.”83 According to the study of European Commission. 
(2016b), “the EFC generates economic gains for both Turkey and the EU. Turkey’s 
                                               
83 See Erzan, R. (2018). "Customs Union between EU and Turkey: A Success Story to be 
Nurtured." 
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imports from less developed countries decrease by EUR 1.3 billion while the EU’s 
imports from less developed countries increase by EUR 0.7 billion. In other words, there 
is some erosion of net exports for third countries even though the overall impact is not 
severe. Also, real imports and exports of goods and services for both countries increase 
faster than real GDP. With the EFC option, Turkey will be expected to keep its alignment 
for laws and regulations with those of the EU considering the size difference of both 
parties. A new mechanism that provides stronger coordination between the EU and 
Turkey could be established with the EFC option. This mechanism would help Turkey to 
take necessary measures with FTA partners of the EU. Another mechanism could be 
provided to share information on the ongoing FTA negotiations with third parties. In order 
to eliminate the asymmetries, different ways for implementing the reciprocity for Turkish 
access to the EU’s new FTAs could be established with EFC option.”84 Yalcin, E. (2016) 
suggests a more comprehensive customs union to overcome the negative welfare effects 
of the asymmetrical system. He implies that “the European customs agreement could be 
expanded with a passage in which all of the EU’s trade agreements with third countries 
are automatically extended to customs-union members too.”85 
 
In the Impact Assessment paper of the European Commission (2016a), the EFC 
option is described as the CU modernization and FTA in additional areas (CU+FTA). 
                                               
84 See the report European Commission. (2016b). “Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral 
Preferential Trade Framework, Including the Customs Union, and an Assessment of Its Possible 
Enhancement.” 
85 See Yalcin, E. (2016). “EU-Turkish Customs Union: A Reasonable Roadmap” 
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Similar to the EFC, CU+FTA emphasizes the modernization of the CU by improving its 
functioning, addressing its design deficiencies and extending the scope of the bilateral 
trade with a new FTA that covers liberalization in services and agriculture, establishment 
and public procurement. 
 
Impact Assessment paper also emphasizes Turkey’s difficulty in concluding 
FTAs with third countries and shows that Turkey can also benefit from the trade 
preferences of the EU FTAs. With CU+FTA option, both sides would explore 
improvements in the exchange of information mechanism to facilitate Turkey’s alignment 
with the EU. Regarding the dispute settlement mechanism, CU+FTA option takes into 
consideration of including an arbitration panel with binding rulings and mediation 
mechanism to find solutions to problems. Considering the structure and trade costs, some 
of the researches think that modernization and upgrading the CU seems to be more 
beneficial than eliminating CU and replacing it with a deep and comprehensive FTA.86 
 
3.3.  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) was suggested as another 
option in the European Commission studies. This option replaces the CU with an FTA 
that covers all goods trade including industrial, agricultural and fishery products, services, 
                                               
86 See the report European Commission. (2016a). “Impact Assessment.” 
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non-tariff barriers, public procurement as well as the establishment. Considering that the 
EU’s current aim towards free trade agreements became more like deep and enhanced 
while the current CU between Turkey and the EU becomes outdated, Turkey would be 
more eager to establish a deep and comprehensive agreement with the EU. Also,  Colares, 
J. F. and M. T. Durmus (2019) emphasize that “since Turkey’s main trade objective has 
been to reduce its uninterrupted trade deficit, a CU-free Turkey could improve market 
access for its exports by offering new concessions based on the significant reserve of tariff 
discretion available in its WTO tariff bindings.”87  There might be more benefits if FTA 
is concluded between the EU and Turkey rather than CU. It would have been better for 
Turkey to have signed an FTA with the EU if we consider the especially after the EU’s 
2006 change of trade strategy in favor of FTAs. This would have given Turkey more 
flexibility in chasing a more efficient trade policy with third countries. Therefore DCFTA 
option would also solve the asymmetry problem because FTA replaces the CU in 
industrial goods, costs arising from rules of origin are reestablished and Turkey can apply 
its full tariffs to third parties that have FTAs with the EU, but not with Turkey. 
 
“The scope of the DCFTA is the same to the EFC, however it is less ambitious in 
terms of depth of liberalization in the goods and services. Compared to the EFC, the 
bilateral trade gains with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) are more 
modest” according to the European Commission (2016b). The net gains for the EU is  
                                               
87 See Colares, J. F. and M. T. Durmus (2019). "TURK-SWITCH: The Tariff-Leverage and Legal 
Case for Turkey’s Switch from EU–Turkey Customs Union to FTAs with the European Union 
and Beyond." 
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EUR 8 billion while Turkey faces a decline for bilateral exports to the EU of EUR 5.3 
billion.88 
 
As Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004) underlines, “the EU must undertake a 
significant effort to alleviate the concerns of the Turkish side in terms of the policy 
dependency framework, particularly in relation to the development of a genuinely 
common commercial policy. Yet both the EU and Turkey must start to address this issue 
in more imaginative ways so as to bring workable, adaptable and flexible solutions to the 
core problems of policy dependency and institutional cooperation.” “There are, however, 
no simple solutions to this dilemma. Turkey cannot automatically be made a party to the 
free trade agreements that the Community has negotiated or will negotiate. There will 
have to be separate negotiations. Yet the Community can induce a trading partner to open 




                                               
88 See the report European Commission. (2016b). “Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral 
Preferential Trade Framework, Including the Customs Union, and an Assessment of Its Possible 
Enhancement.” 
89 See Ü lgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004). “The future of Turkish-EU trade relations: 
Deepening vs widening” 
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CHAPTER VII: Conclusion 
 
Customs Union has been established through the EU-Turkey Association Council 
Decision 1/95 in 1996 as a final step of the Association Agreement that was signed in 
1963.  The EU-Turkey CU that covers industrial goods including processed agricultural 
commodities but excluding ECSC products has contributed economic benefits for both 
sides substantially. Turkey was the ‘5th largest partner for exports of goods from the EU’ 
and ‘6th largest partner for imports of goods to the EU among the EU’s trading partners’ 
in 2017. Turkey’s competitiveness in manufacturing sectors, demand for Turkish exports 
in the EU market and the foreign direct investment flow to Turkey has increased 
significantly during the EU-Turkey CU period. 
 
Due to CU obligations, Turkey adopted the common commercial policy of the 
EU and started to use common external tariff towards imports from third countries. CU 
enables the third parties, which have an FTA with EU, tariff-free access to Turkey. 
Consequently, even if the subject third country does not have FTA with Turkey, they still 
enjoy the benefits of the Turkish market as long as they have FTA with the EU. Turkey 
does not have the authority to grant tariff preferences impartially of the EU, nor can it 
adopt lower tariffs than the common commercial tariff in its bilateral trade agreements. 
In this case, Turkey has no other option but to sign an FTA with that third party in order 
to prevent possible trade deficit.  
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As another obligation of the EU-Turkey CU, Turkey has agreed to engage in FTA 
negotiations in parallel with the EU. After the establishment of CU, there have been a 
great number of FTAs concluded by the EU. Currently, Turkey has 19 FTAs in force and 
most of them faced asymmetrical legal bindings when they entered into force. 
“Accordingly, Turkey’s FTAs usually enforces Turkey to abolish tariffs and similar 
measures as soon as the agreement enters into force, while allowing the partner country 
to dismantle its barriers to Turkish products progressively.”90 For instance, countries like 
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia had to follow different time schedule while abolishing 
customs duties for industrial products originating from Turkey. Time gap vary from 9 
years to 13 years depending on the schedule from the EU Association Agreements or 
Turkey FTAs. 
 
The effect of the EU’s FTAs on Turkey is most of the times negative due to the 
fact that the EU’s FTAs create trade deficit in Turkey until Turkey signs a separate trade 
agreement with that country. However, some of the countries with which the EU had 
concluded or continue to negotiate FTAs are not eager to have a parallel preferential 
agreement with Turkey because they already gain preferential access to Turkish market 
thanks to the EU-Turkey CU. Additionally, after Turkey tries to start negotiations for an 
FTA with the third party that has concluded an FTA with the EU, this time period puts 
Turkey out of countenance and creates asymmetrical market competition. For instance, 
                                               
90 See Akman, M. S. (2010). "The European Union's trade strategy and its reflections on 
Turkey: An evaluation from the perspective of free trade agreements." 
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countries like Mexico, South Africa, and Algeria benefit tariff-free Turkish market while 
Turkey has to face tariffs from these countries because there is no FTA between them. 
Turkey has been continuously facing a trade deficit from Mexico except 2001, 2002 and 
2004. Similar to Mexico, Turkey has been facing continuous trade deficit that ranked up 
to 1,5 billion USD from South Africa. On the other hand, South Korea and Chile cases 
show that FTAs signed with third countries after the EU can still prevent or decrease the 
trade deficit in Turkey. After South Korea-Turkey FTA that came into force in 2013, 
Turkey’s exports to South Korea have increased by approximately 98% from 460 million 
USD to 929 million USD. Additionally, Chile case shows that after Chile-Turkey FTA 
that came into force in 2011, the trade deficit of Turkey continuously decreased and 
finally Turkey made a trade surplus in 2018. 
 
When the EU-Turkey CU was established, Turkey was expected to be a full 
member of the EU in four to eight years if the membership obligations were fulfilled. 
Therefore, Turkey did not consider the decision-making process as a big problem because 
it was supposed to be temporary. Nevertheless, after more than twenty years from the 
establishment of CU, Turkey is still not a member country of the EU and the lack of voice 
in decision making creates a problem for Turkey. The asymmetrical FTAs became a 
frustration for Turkey especially after the mid-2000s because of the EU’s new trade 
strategy of comprehensive FTAs and lack of voice in the negotiations of these agreements. 
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Andorra and San Marino, which also have a separate CU with the EU, have been 
successfully negotiated in all recent FTAs concluded by the EU unlike Turkey. The EU 
started to add a ‘Turkey Clause’ that asks its trading partner to negotiate a similar 
agreement with Turkey but this declaration is not legally binding so most of the times 
countries do not favor starting negotiations for a separate FTA with Turkey. Turkish 
Government has announced a revised Turkey Clause that emphasizes third parties shall 
conclude another FTA with Turkey in parallel with the EU, and if there is a delay until 
third parties conclude an FTA with Turkey after the EU, third parties shall obtain the same 
custom tariffs with the EU for Turkish products.  Joint Declaration has not been successful 
so far except some cases like South Korea or Chile.  
 
There have been a number of possible options suggested by researchers to solve 
the asymmetrical FTA problem. One of the possible options is to start single and joint 
negotiations where Turkey participates as an observer and have the right to discuss its 
economic benefits or losses from these agreements. Another option would be an enhanced 
commercial framework that keeps the same structure but adding an FTA that covers trade 
in agriculture and fishery products, services and establishment, non-tariff barriers and 
public procurement. With the enhanced commercial framework, both sides would have 
improvements in the exchange of information mechanism to enable Turkey’s alignment 
with the EU. Regarding the dispute settlement mechanism, this option takes into 
consideration including an arbitration panel with binding rulings and mediation 
mechanism to find solutions to problems. Lastly, replacing CU with an FTA that covers 
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all goods trade including industrial, agricultural and fishery products, services, non-tariff 
barriers, public procurement as well as the establishment can be seen as another option. 
The scope of the DCFTA is the same as the EFC, however, it is less ambitious in terms 
of liberalization in the goods and services. 
 
Asymmetrical FTAs could create bigger problems in the future since the EU is 
currently in negotiations for deeper trade agreements. Both the Turkish government and 
the EU recognize the shortcomings of the CU, including the FTA asymmetry problem 
and agreed on modernizing and updating the CU. In 2015, the European Commission and 
the Turkish government have officially started the negotiations on CU modernization. 
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Abstract in Korean (국문 초록) 
 
 
유럽 연합 - 터키 관세 동맹 FTA 과정의 비대칭: 
효과와 향후 방향 
 
터키와 유럽 연합 (EU) 간의 관세 동맹은 1996 년에 설립된 이래로 양국 
경제에 많은 공헌을 해왔습니다. 그러나 현재의 관세 동맹은 미래의 경제적 
이득을 저해할 수 있는 몇 가지 문제점들을 보이고 있습니다. 본 연구에서는 
유럽연합 (EU)과 터키 간의 관세 동맹 문제 중 하나인 대외 무역 협정 (FTA) 
과정의 비대칭에 초점을 맞출 것입니다. 
 
비대칭 중 하나는 EU 의 공동 상업 정책(Common Commercial Policy)에 
기인합니다. 관세 동맹의 설립과 함께 터키는 EU 와 관세 규정을 동일하게 
적용하기로 합의했습니다. 결과적으로 터키에 대한 제 3 자 수출이 관세가 없는 
접근의 혜택을 누리고 있지만, 터키는 여전히 동일한 제 3 자에게 제품을 
수출하면서 관세에 노출되어 있습니다. 이러한 비대칭적인 상황은 터키에 
불공정한 시장 여건을 조성합니다. 
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뿐만 아니라 터키는 제 3 국과의 협상을 시작하거나 새로운 무역 협정을 
체결할 때 EU 의 구속력을 받게 되어 있습니다. 특히, EU 의 새로운 무역 전략이 
대국 경제와의 깊고 포괄적인 무역 협정을 가져오게 됨으로써 터키 미래 경제에 
더 큰 문제를 야기할 수 있게 됩니다. 이 때문에 터키는 이 문제를 해결할 수 있는 
가능한 방안을 모색하고 있습니다. 
 
키워드 : 터키 - 유럽 연합 관세 동맹, FTA 비대칭, 공동 상업 정책, 무역 
적자 
 
